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The Grenfell Tower Inquiry has painted a vivid picture of the world we must leave behind

The evidence that has emerged during the Grenfell Tower Inquiry has painted a dispiriting picture of both the public and private sectors. As the evidence reaches its close, Peter Apps offers some reflections

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The Grenfell Tower Inquiry’s headquarters in Paddington (picture: SWNS)
The Grenfell Tower Inquiry’s headquarters in Paddington (picture: SWNS)
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The evidence that has emerged during the Grenfell Tower Inquiry has painted a dispiriting picture of both the public and private sectors. As the evidence reaches its close, Peter Apps offers some reflections #UKhousing

The last two-and-a-half years have been like no other in recent memory. The country has convulsed its way through seemingly unending political turmoil, extreme weather, Brexit negotiations, war in Europe and a pandemic.

Amid all this, the mammoth second phase of the Grenfell Tower Inquiry, slowly and steadily playing out in an anonymous-looking conference building around the corner from Paddington Station in west London, has too often vanished beneath the surface of the public consciousness.

This is a shame. Because its investigations have, piece by piece, delivered a stunning condemnation of the state of our public and private sectors, from ground-level social housing management to the corridors of Whitehall, taking in the fire service and the construction industry on its way. 

During that time, Inside Housing had followed all of the 308 days of evidence. As the process now finally comes to a close, here are some reflections. 


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The first thing to say is that this process - dry, lengthy, complex and frustrating as it has occasionally been - has been enormously important. 

At the start, back in January 2020, I would have credited myself with knowing quite a lot about why the Grenfell Tower fire happened. The truth is I had only the faintest outline of the story and it would never have emerged without an inquiry tenacious and powerful enough to take on a secretive government and giant corporations with much to lose. 

The steady, fearless cross examination of the witnesses has left them with nowhere to hide and forced significant admissions about the mistakes which led to the blaze. 

There are those who would have preferred the police investigation to go first. That – particularly from the affected community who are being made to wait far too long for justice – is understandable. 

But had it, this evidence would have been investigated in private by poorly resourced non-specialist detectives and Crown Prosecution Service (CPS) lawyers. Any flaws in their work would never have been known. 

Now if we do not see justice, then we will at least be able to explain in detail why this is a miscarriage of grave proportions. And if we do not get change, we will at least be able to state in the clearest terms why this is a devastating mistake. These two facts are probably the best reason for hope in the ongoing battle for both. 

So what of the story the inquiry has revealed? We have reported the details piece by piece over 84 weeks, and they are simply too large to try to summarise in full here. 

It has felt like a once-in-a-lifetime peek behind the curtain of how organisations behave when they think no one is watching. What is scariest about that is the fact that the behaviour has been remarkably consistent.

Time and again, I have been asked: did even one organisation do what they should have by the people of Grenfell Tower? As we have progressed through many layers of the public, private and hybrid sectors under scrutiny, the answer has always been a resounding “no”.

In the private sector there was a callous indifference to anything – morality, honesty, life safety – that was not related to the bottom line of the business. 

In the public sector there was an aversion to anything that disrupted the status quo, a weary cynicism and an insular desire to protect the reputation of organisations by refusing to admit or actively concealing flaws. 

Why has this come about? 

In the first module, which examined the behaviour of the construction sector during the refurbishment, there was a startling lack of accountability. Nobody felt responsible because nobody was made responsible.

“The evidence exposed a system where the checks and balances were provided by private companies, who viewed manufacturers or builders as clients and did not want to lose business by upsetting them”

Questions about safety could always be passed up and down a complex supply chain. In an environment where profit margins were constantly squeezed and companies flirted with insolvency, cash was all that mattered. The cheapest option and the quickest option won the day. Compliance and safety were silly questions, to be addressed only in terms of what could be gotten away with, not what needed to be done. 

In the second module – which looked at those who made, sold and tested the violently combustible products used in the cladding system – the behaviour was yet more sinister. 

Devastating fire tests were concealed, misleading safety certificates were knowingly obtained and products were pushed for use on high-rise buildings despite their dangerous fire performance being known. 

Sitting behind all this behaviour was a ruthless drive for sales by three global corporations under scrutiny: Kingspan, Celotex (part of Saint Gobain) and Arconic. 

Kingspan’s marketing team brushed off questions about safety bluntly. The technical manager at the time wrote that a firm raising questions about the safety of its product could “go fuck themselves and if they are not careful we will sue the arse of them [sic]”. 

Arconic, meanwhile, sat on tests demonstrating the danger of the product from as early as 2004, with internal emails instructing staff to keep the fire performance of the cladding panels ultimately used on Grenfell “VERY CONFIDENTIAL”. 

At Celotex, the manager asked to develop a product for the high-rise market questioned the sense of pushing for sales on tall buildings “because in the event of a fire it will burn”. He was overruled by those pushing for sales. 

The evidence exposed a system where the checks and balances which may have kept this behaviour in check were provided by private companies who viewed those they were supposedly scrutinising as clients and overtly fretted about losing business if they did not do their bidding. 

“The frailty of this house of cards was an ideal prop to facilitate industry capture of an inadequately robust regulatory regime,” said Stephanie Barwise QC, representing the bereaved and survivors. 

This part of the inquiry is a gigantic red flag which simply must lead to systemic change going beyond the bounds of the cladding industry. The same incentives exist wherever one industry pays another to test its products and helps set its own rules. This matters greatly. 

If companies approach, for example, their ‘net zero’ obligations with the same attitude to which those under examination here approached the claim that their products were of limited combustibility, then the future of the world will be hot, nasty, brutish and short. 

Module three turned the spotlight onto social housing and should be troubling for those who care about this sector. It revealed a shocking failure to listen to residents’ concerns, and a risibly poor performance when it came to maintaining basic fire safety standards, which appear to have had devastating impacts

Sitting behind this was an attitude where the managing company and council appeared to see themselves as in conflict with the residents of the tower, instead of a company providing a service to them. Residents who raised complaints had checks run on their tenancy background and were branded troublemakers in internal emails. 

External scrutiny, meanwhile, appears to have been treated as an annoyance to be avoided, not a crucial warning that all was not well. The board worked to defend itself, not to drive change. The housing sector must look at this evidence, learn from it and change, not indulge in a defence of the actions on display. 

This module also exposed a failure to plan for the escape of disabled residents, which continues today and was undoubtedly a policy position set by central government that spread far beyond west London.

It underscored the terrifying way in which the lives of vulnerable people appear to matter less in policy terms and must, in the final analysis, be understood as a critical cause of the fire resulting in so many deaths.

Sadly, the attitude that deaths where there is ’existing vulnerability’ or ’co-morbidity’ matter less has been echoed in events outside the inquiry room, during the pandemic and the recent extreme weather.

It is a worrying indictment of the British state and society in general. Just because protecting the rights of a disabled or vulnerable person is more complex, does not mean they should be abandoned. As Allison Munroe QC said, it is a club we may all join eventually.  

Sitting behind all this was politics, which became particularly apparent in Module Six. This was not limited to a single period or single party, but reflected and repeated across 30 years of failure by the British state. 

Government after government pledged to cut ‘red tape’, reduce regulation on industry and free companies to “innovate” by setting their own rules and managing their own affairs. 

“Even six deaths at Lakanal House were not enough to shake the government out of its obsession with deregulating the construction industry”

Amid industry pressure not to toughen standards, successive governments failed to explicitly toughen fire standards to ban the cladding ultimately used on Grenfell, despite increasingly clear warnings.

In 2001, it had even sponsored an official test that clearly showed the danger of the exact material later used on the tower but still failed to make the relatively minor tweak required to ban it. This test was never released, even after Grenfell. Without the inquiry, it would likely still be hidden in dusty government archives. 

Even six deaths at Lakanal House in 2009 and painfully clear recommendations from the coroner in 2013 were not enough to shake the primacy of deregulation in favour of fire safety. 

“We only have a duty to respond to the coroner, not kiss her backside,” wrote official Brian Martin, responsible for the relevant guidance. He also extolled the need to protect the interests of “UK plc”. 

In the aftermath of the fire, the government insisted – wrongly – that the cladding used on Grenfell was subject to an outright ban. It did so - it appears - because it knew that any other statement would be utterly unpalatable. 

This should be an important lesson to politicians who extol deregulation and cutting red tape. Grenfell shows us that, when push comes to shove, people do think the state should regulate to ensure their homes do not become fire traps, rather than leave this decision to the wisdom of the market. Deregulating in the face of safety concerns is placing economic theory above common sense and will be seen that way by the public in the final analysis. 

Civil servant Brian Martin arrives at the Grenfell Tower Inquiry (picture: SWNS)
Civil servant Brian Martin arrives at the Grenfell Tower Inquiry (picture: SWNS)

There was also a constant theme of decay in the public sector. From the fire service to the civil service, staff were demotivated and exhausted by resource pressures and appeared capable of little more than keeping the most basic functions going.

Whether something was safe, appropriate or even legal was a secondary concern. 

They came across as imprisoned by the structures they worked in, believing they had no power to change or even challenge the accepted way of doing things, but simply to keep them going. 

As Danny Friedman QC, one of the barristers for bereaved and survivors, said: “Everyday moral restraints make it hard for people, especially public servants, to admit inhumanity or comprehend that inhumanity is not restricted to bad people.

“And yet, it occurs in bureaucracies and businesses when basic moral restraints become neutralised or otherwise compromised.”

How had they been compromised? If public sector organisations are constantly defunded, devalued and told to do more with less, their cultures will sour. People who come to work bitter and tired become, in the end, concerned only with shovelling through the latest pile in front of them.

“The anxiety and frustration of not being able to actually move things forward was... going to kill me if I stayed,” said Richard Harral, a senior member of the team of civil servants responsible for the building regulations. 

“I resigned because I had enough. I wasn’t able to do the job how I was taught to do it. It was affecting my health and I just didn’t want to work there any more,” said John Hoban, the building control officer who ultimately signed off the tower’s deadly refurbishment.

“A failure to plan for the escape of disabled residents, which continues today, underscored the terrifying way in which the lives of vulnerable people appear to matter less in policy terms”

While these circumstances are not complete excuses for what happened, they reveal an alarming consistency among the two arms of the state that were arguably in the most pivotal positions to stop the catastrophe.

A crumbling public sector doesn’t show itself immediately. People carry on, patch things up, work overtime, stretch themselves beyond their capabilities and eventually break. That’s what happened here. 

What can be done about all this? 

One apparent lesson is the value of transparency. People, and the organisations they work for, care for their reputations and invest in protecting them. This can force change, but only if they are capable of being exposed. 

Had Arconic, Celotex and Kingspan been obliged to release the full details of the testing on systems containing their products in the years before the fire, they would have been far less likely to end up on the walls of people’s homes. 

Had Rydon, Studio E and Harley Facades been required to answer candidly the questions of residents concerned about their work, then key mistakes might not have been made.

The state has the power to enforce this transparency when it comes to matters of life safety. There is no convincing argument for it not to do so. 

Another factor that would focus minds in board rooms would be prosecutions. The inverse is true. Bluntly, if no one goes to prison, the message to the industry will be that this behaviour is tolerated and we will not see change, however well crafted the inquiry’s recommendations are. 

It is also no exaggeration to say that if the Metropolitan Police is to have any hope of a relationship of trust with the working class communities of London, it must show that it is willing and able to prosecute the people responsible for the deaths of a community like them in Grenfell Tower.

Anything less will be a fatal blow to its legitimacy in the city. This investigation should matter to the Met more than any other in its history. Not least because in terms of lives lost it is the biggest crime it has ever investigated, larger than all the terror attacks on London this century combined. 

“Will any of this lead to change? The evidence appears to call for a root-and-branch restructuring of the public sector and the way industry is regulated. That is a tough ask”

Finally, I am also often asked: will any of this lead to change? It is difficult to feel positive. The evidence appears to call for a root-and-branch restructuring of the public sector and the way industry is regulated. 

The rejection of key recommendations from the first phase as not proportionate does not bode well. Neither do current boastful pledges from Conservative Party leadership hopefuls and the leader of the Labour Party about cutting red tape. 

Neither, when the question is ultimately one of compassion, does the fact that the government spent the fifth anniversary of the fire trying to fly asylum seekers to Rwanda.

But while the state is the only body large and powerful enough to drive the industry-wide change that is required, change need not only come from government.

It is open to anyone who worked in the myriad industries which gave us the Grenfell Tower fire - and I include myself as a housing journalist among that wide group - to resolve to be better.

To be more honest, less cynical, more willing to admit fault, more compassionate, more able to see that the way we’ve done things in the past does not have to be the way we will do things in the future and more alive to the fact that there are human beings at the sharpest end of any of our systemic failings.  

In delivering some hard truths, the inquiry has given us all this chance to change. We must take it, and leave the world which gave us Grenfell behind. 

Peter Apps, deputy editor, Inside Housing

Grenfell Tower Inquiry phase two: weekly diaries

Grenfell Tower Inquiry phase two: weekly diaries

Module one: the refurbishment

Week one: A vivid picture of a broken industry

After a week of damning revelations at the opening of phase two of the Grenfell Tower Inquiry, Peter Apps recaps the key points

Click here to read the full story

Week two: What is the significance of the immunity application?

Sir Martin Moore-Bick has written to the attorney general requesting protection for those set to give evidence at the Grenfell Tower Inquiry. Peter Apps explains what the move means

Click here to read the full story

Week three: Architects of misfortune

This week saw the lead architects for the Grenfell Tower refurbishment give evidence to the inquiry. Peter Apps runs through the key points

Click here to read the full story

Week four: ‘I didn’t have any perception that it was the monster it’s become’

The architects continued to give evidence this week, outlining a lack of understanding of the fire risk posed by the cladding materials and its design. Nathaniel Barker reports

Click here to read the full story

Week five: ‘No adverse effect in relation to external fire spread’

As the Grenfell Tower Inquiry returns from its long absence, Peter Apps recaps the key points from a week of important evidence from the fire consultants to the refurbishment

Click here to read the full story

Week six: ‘I can’t recall any instance where I discussed the materials with building control’

Nathaniel Barker summarises what we learned from fire engineers Exova, architects Studio E and the early evidence from contractor Rydon

Click here to read the full story

Week seven: ‘I do not think I have ever worked with a contractor operating with this level of nonchalance’

Two key witnesses from contractor Rydon gave evidence this week. Peter Apps recaps some of the key points from a revealing week of evidence

Click here to read the full story

Week eight: ‘It haunts me that it wasn't challenged’

Four witnesses from contractor Rydon gave evidence this week. Lucie Heath recaps what we learned on the last week of evidence before the inquiry breaks for five weeks

Click here to read the full story

Week nine: ‘All I can say is you will be taken out for a very nice meal very soon’

This week the inquiry heard evidence from witnesses at Harley Facades, the sub-contractor responsible for Grenfell Tower’s cladding. Peter Apps recaps the key points

Click here to read the full story

Week 10: ‘As we all know, ACM will be gone rather quickly in a fire!’

As the Grenfell Tower Inquiry entered its 10th week, Jack Simpson recaps the key points from a week of important evidence from the refurbishment’s cladding contractor

Click here to read the full story

Week 11: ‘Did you get the impression Grenfell Tower was a guinea pig for this insulation?’

With witnesses from the cladding subcontractor, the firm which cut the deadly panels to shape and the clerk of works which inspected the job giving evidence this was week full of revelations. Peter Apps recaps the key points

Click here to read the full story

Week 12: ‘Would you accept that was a serious failing on your part?’

With the surveyor who inspected Grenfell Tower for compliance giving evidence, this was a crucial week from the inquiry. Dominic Brady and Peter Apps report

Click here to read the full story

Week 13: ‘Value for money is to be regarded as the key driver for this project’

With consultants to Kensington & Chelsea Tenant Management Organisation (KCTMO) giving evidence, attention at the Grenfell Tower Inquiry turned for this first time to the actions of the TMO and the council. Peter Apps reports

Click here to read the full story

Week 14: ‘Did it not occur to you at this point that your budget was simply too low?’

This week, for the first time in phase two, the inquiry heard from Kensington & Chelsea Tenant Management Organisation, the landlord that oversaw the fatal refurbishment of Grenfell Tower. Lucie Heath reports

Click here to read the full story

Week 15: ‘Have you ever informed the police that you destroyed documents relevant to their investigation?’

Witnesses from the Kensington and Chelsea Tenant Management Organisation (KCTMO) gave evidence for a second week, which began with a shocking revelation about withheld and destroyed evidence. Peter Apps recaps

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Week 16: ‘I conclude this was very serious evidence of professional negligence’

This week saw members of Kensington & Chelsea Tenant Management Organisation finish giving evidence, before the inquiry’s expert witnesses took the stand to make some highly critical assessments of the work they had seen before and during the refurbishment of Grenfell Tower. Jack Simpson recaps

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Grenfell Tower: a timeline of the refurbishment

Following the conclusion of module one of the Grenfell Inquiry’s second phase, Peter Apps presents a timeline of the key moments during the fatal refurbishment of the west London tower block

Click here to read the full story

Module two: the cladding products

Week 17: ‘It’s hard to make a note about this because we are not clean’

The start of the second module of the Grenfell Tower Inquiry phase two came with some huge revelations about the companies that sold the products used in the cladding system. Peter Apps reports

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Week 18: ‘It was just reckless optimism wasn't it?’

As the inquiry began cross-examining witnesses for the second module of its phase two work, the picture surrounding just how Grenfell Tower ended up wrapped in such dangerous materials became a little clearer. Nathaniel Barker was keeping an eye on proceedings

Click here to read the full story

Week 19: ‘And that was intentional, deliberate, dishonest?’

The Grenfell Tower Inquiry this week heard the shocking story of how the insulation manufacturer “manipulated” official testing and marketed its product “dishonestly”. Peter Apps tells the story

Click here to read the full story

Week 20: ‘We were outed by a consultant who we then had to fabricate a story to’

This week the inquiry investigated the actions of Kingspan – the manufacturer of one of the insulation products used in the tower’s cladding system. Dominic Brady reports

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Week 21: ‘It’s there in black and white isn't it? We see a complete absence of any consideration of life safety’

The story of insulation giant Kingspan’s testing and marketing of its combustible insulation for high rises was unpacked in minute detail this week. Peter Apps reports

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Week 22: ‘All we do is lie in here’

In the third week of evidence from insulation giant Kingspan, the inquiry continued to uncover shocking details about the firm’s behaviour both before and after the Grenfell Tower fire. Lucie Heath reports

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Week 23: ‘That would have come as an earthquake to you at the time, would it not?’

This week the inquiry took its deepest dive yet into the inner workings of the cladding manufacturer whose product has been blamed for the terrible spread of fire up Grenfell Tower. Nathaniel Barker reports

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Week 24: ‘Do you accept that Test 5B was Arconic's deadly secret’

The president of the firm that made and sold the cladding panels installed on Grenfell Tower was asked to account for the apparent concealment of “disastrous” fire tests on the product this week. Peter Apps reports

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Week 25: ‘This is quite an incredible list of omissions and missed instances, isn’t it?’

This week the Grenfell Tower Inquiry heard its first witnesses from the Building Research Establishment (BRE) - the testing house which carried out key fire tests on the Kingspan and Celotex insulation products which were later used on Grenfell Tower. Peter Apps reports.

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Week 26: 'You were taking an enormous risk, weren't you?'

Week 26 at the Grenfell Tower Inquiry was a key moment in understanding how dangerous products used on the tower came to be accepted by industry professionals. Dominic Brady reports

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Week 27: ‘What will happen if one building made out [of] PE core is in fire and will kill 60 to 70 persons?’

The most explosive evidence this week at the Grenfell Tower Inquiry came from those who did not attend, as the evidence which would have been presented to Arconic witnesses was displayed in their absence. Peter Apps reports

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Week 28: ‘This is a serious safety matter’

This week the Grenfell Tower Inquiry zeroed in on the British Board of Agrément, the body that produced “misleading” certificates which inspired trust in both the cladding and insulation used on the tower. Lucie Heath reports

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Week 29:  ‘Is it true that Kingspan’s position… was to do its best to ensure that science was secretly perverted for financial gain?’

The final week in this section of the Grenfell Tower Inquiry primarily examined the attempts by insulation manufacturer Kingspan to lobby government after the fire. Peter Apps reports

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How the products used in Grenfell Tower's cladding system were tested and sold

As the section of the Grenfell Tower Inquiry examining how the products used in the cladding system were tested, marketed and sold comes to a close, Peter Apps summarises what we have learned about each of the products included in the system

Click here to read the full story

Module Three: the management of the tower

Week 30: ‘There is certainly a high probability that in the event of a fire the whole building can become an inferno’

The focus of the inquiry shifted this week to the actions of the social housing providers responsible for maintaining Grenfell Tower. Pete Apps recaps what we learned

Click here to read the full story

Week 31: ‘If we cannot get out people will die’

This week saw the former residents of Grenfell Tower enter the witness box to tell of their experiences attempting to raise complaints with the council and its managing agent. Pete Apps reports

Click here to read the full story

Week 32: ‘Let's hope our luck holds and there isn't a fire’

This week saw the return of the landlord of Grenfell Tower, Kensington and Chelsea Tenant Management Organisation (KCTMO), as senior staff members attempted to explain how vital fire safety protections at the block were allowed to fall into disrepair. Lucie Heath reports

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Week 33: ‘Isn't that a serious gap in the scope of a policy meant to safeguard vulnerable people?’

A slightly disjointed week at the Grenfell Tower inquiry saw further evidence from staff at building manager Kensington and Chelsea Tenant Management Organisation (KCTMO) interspersed with the views of a cladding expert. Peter Apps reports

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Week 34: ‘Some members of the community are doing their best to spread false information’

Jack Simpson covers all the major revelations from the past week of evidence at the Grenfell Inquiry, including evidence from Laura Johnson, director of housing at the Royal Borough of Kensington and Chelsea.

Click here to read the full story  

Week 35: ‘I really didn’t like the champagne’ 

This week the Grenfell Tower Inquiry saw council witnesses, including former deputy leader Rock Feilding-Mellen and leader Nicholas Paget-Brown, questioned about their role in the story for the first time. Peter Apps reports

Click here to read the full story

Week 36: ‘Is that not a very incurious approach for a fire risk assessor?’

This week the Grenfell Tower Inquiry scrutinised the work of Carl Stokes, the man hired to carry out fire risk assessments for the block. Nathaniel Barker reports

Click here to read the full story

Week 37: ‘In giving that advice, weren’t you acting beyond your knowledge and expertise?’

A curtailed week at the Grenfell Tower Inquiry saw fire risk assessor Carl Stokes grilled over advice he gave regarding the tower’s cladding. Peter Apps reports

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Week 38: ‘Well it’s a bit more than that, isn’t it. He’s suggesting that you tell the LFB a lie’

The inquiry heard the mammoth cross-examination of KCTMO’s health and safety manager Janice Wray this week. Peter Apps reports

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Week 39: ‘What you said there was a grotesque understatement’

This week the inquiry continued to hear from former employees of Kensington and Chelsea Tenant Management Organisation, as well as two employees from the London Fire Brigade. Lucie Heath reports

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Week 40: ‘An exercise in concealment and half-truth’

Former KCTMO chief executive Robert Black gave his evidence to the inquiry this week and was asked to account for the various failures described over the previous six weeks. Peter Apps and Nathaniel Barker report.

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Week 41: ‘We should do nothing. This is not the sort of website we should be responding to’

This week saw the return of Robert Black, chief executive of Kensington and Chelsea Tenant Management Organisation (KCTMO), before the inquiry turned its attention to the defective smoke control system in the tower. Dominic Brady reports

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Week 42:‘They would leak as much as they leaked. They were what they were’

The Grenfell Tower Inquiry continued its in-depth investigation of the tower’s non-compliant smoke control system this week, with evidence from the various contractors involved in delivering it. Pete Apps reports 

Click here to read the full story

Week 43:‘Contractors at the time were not generally aware of the importance of leaving holes unsealed’

This week the inquiry focused on two of the more overlooked areas of the Grenfell Tower fire, with evidence focusing on the gas pipelines and lifts within the west London block. It was a packed week, with five witnesses giving evidence. Jack Simpson reports

Click here to read the full story

Week 44:‘I've never seen a fully compliant firefighting lift in any local authority building, to this day actually’

This week the inquiry turn the focus onto the building’s defective lifts, with evidence from an expert, contractors who worked on them and a former engineer at KCTMO. Pete Apps reports. 

Click here to read the full story

Week 45: ‘Don’t you find all this rather a surprising debate, given that the Equality Act was passed in 2010?’

The inquiry heard from expert witness Colin Todd this week, who gave his views about the work of risk assessor Carl Stokes as well as answered questions about his own guidance. Peter Apps and Nathaniel Barker report

Click here to read the full story

Week 46: ‘I think I've been very, very clear that is completely wrong’

This week the inquiry heard further expert evidence about fire risk assessor Carl Stokes’ actions, as the section of its work covering the management and maintenance of the tower concluded. Peter Apps reports

Click here to read the full story

Six key failures in the way Grenfell Tower was managed before the fire

Peter Apps recaps some of what we have learned about the actions of the Royal Borough of Kensington and Chelsea (RBKC) and Kensington and Chelsea Tenant Management Organisation (KCTMO) in the years before the fire.

Module one and two closing statements

Week 47: ‘An unedifying spectacle’

After a week of closing statements from the core participants involved in modules one and two, Lucie Heath recaps the key arguments of each group

Click here to read the full story

Module five: the fire brigade

Week 48: ‘They knew, and lives could and should have been saved’

The phase of the Grenfell Tower Inquiry examining the actions of the London Fire Brigade in the years before the fire kicked off this week with some major revelations. Peter Apps reports

Click here to read the full story

Week 49: ‘I'm not sure we've always taken every opportunity to learn as an organisation’

How the London Fire Brigade acted upon lessons from incidents in the years before the Grenfell Tower disaster came under the microscope this week at the public inquiry. Nathaniel Barker reports

Click here to read the full story

Week 50: ‘There is a culture in LFB that is very conservative. I think there is great comfort in what is familiar’

This week the inquiry heard how the London Fire Brigade (LFB) elected not to issue warnings about dangerous cladding before Grenfell and a detailed examination of its policy for checking high risk buildings. Pete Apps reports. 

Click here to read the full story

Week 51:‘We teach firefighters to expect building failure’

An unusually brief week of evidence at the Grenfell Tower Inquiry explored how a fire service neighbouring London was taking a different approach to tackling blazes in high rises. Nathaniel Barker reports

Click here to read the full story

Week 52: ‘I actually think that there is a measure of incompetence at all levels’

Expert evidence concluded the current section of the inquiry with some stinging criticism of the London Fire Brigade (LFB). Pete Apps and Grainne Cuffe report. 

Click here to read the full story

Module six: fire services

Week 53: ‘They make for chilling reading and harrowing listening’

The inquiry’s investigation into central government began this week with lawyers setting out their view on how and why firefighting policies failed. Peter Apps and Lucie Heath report

Click here to read the full story

Week 54: ‘Our consideration of evacuation at this time was something of a blind spot’

The development of policy on ‘stay put’, both nationally and for London, occupied the attention of the inquiry this week. Peter Apps reports

Click here to read the full story

Week 55: ‘My review is pretty scathing!’

In a week that included the 200th day of evidence in phase two of the inquiry, attention turned to the London Fire Brigade’s control room. Lucie Heath reports

Click here to read the full story

Week 56: ‘Why didn't we thump the table harder’

This week, the control room at the London Fire Brigade was examined further – both before and after the fire. Pete Apps and Lucie Heath report

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Week 57: ‘It was worse than slow, it was sluggish’

Former London Fire Brigade (LFB) commissioner Dany Cotton was the star witness this week, as the inquiry continued to delve into the brigade’s knowledge and training before the Grenfell Tower fire. Jack Simpson, Grainne Cuffe and Pete Apps report

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Week 58: ‘I don't think we deserve to ask for trust until we demonstrate different outcomes’

A current and former commissioner of the London Fire Brigade (LFB) wrapped up the inquiry’s investigation into the actions of the brigade before the fire. Grainne Cuffe and Peter Apps report.

Module six: testing and government 

One of the major scandals of our time: key revelations as the Grenfell Tower Inquiry turns to government

The government was accused of “covering up” the risks of dangerous cladding as its “unbridled passion for deregulation” left it a “junior party” to the construction industry as the latest phase of the public inquiry opened today. Peter Apps summarises some of the main points

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Week 59: ‘Recent tests have apparently shown it continued to burn for 20 minutes after the flame was taken away’

After shocking opening statements, the Grenfell Tower Inquiry turned its attention to the work of Local Authority Building Control. Pete Apps reports

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Week 60: ‘You could have an exact repeat of the Dubai fire in any number of buildings in London’

The Grenfell Tower Inquiry turned its attention to the work of the National House Building Council this week, with shocking revelations about the extent of the warnings issued to central government before the fire. Peter Apps reports

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Week 61: ‘Mistakes are meant for learning, not repeating’

In the first hearings of the new year, the Grenfell Tower Inquiry heard closing statements from the firefighting section of phase two. Lucie Heath reports

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Week 62: Did it ever occur to you that this act of collaboration was, in one sense, corrupting?

The Grenfell Tower Inquiry returned to the work of the National House Building Council (NHBC) this week, with a new shocking revelation about the government’s actions in the immediate aftermath of the fire. Peter Apps reports

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Week 63: ‘It came after the general move to deregulation. So more regulation was not welcome’

The government’s focus on deregulation before the Grenfell Tower fire was placed in the spotlight this week with a series of shocking revelations about its failure to amend fire safety guidance. Pete Apps and Grainne Cuffe report

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Week 64: ‘I didn’t think ACM would be suitable for use in any high-rise buildings. I don’t think anyone did’

This week, the Building Research Establishment’s Dr Sarah Colwell gave more than three days of evidence, with some huge revelations about what was known about the dangers of aluminium composite material years before the fire and the mass confusion over the government’s building regulations. Peter Apps and Jack Simpson report

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Week 65: ‘Unless the government does something now about ACM panels, people will die’

Further evidence from the Building Research Establishment and the first government witnesses added new depth to our understanding of how warnings were missed before the Grenfell Tower fire. Peter Apps reports 

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Week 66: ‘Was there a cover-up?’

The latest evidence from the Grenfell Tower Inquiry tracked the government’s failure to act on fire safety warnings right up until the months before the fire. Peter Apps and Grainne Cuffe report

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Week 67: ‘When exposed to a fire, the aluminium melts away and exposes the polyethylene. Whoosh!’

This week the inquiry heard disturbing new evidence about the failure of senior government officials to act on warnings about dangerous cladding in the years before the Grenfell Tower fire. Peter Apps reports

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Week 68: ‘Can we agree that was a pretty dangerous thing to have, all this falling on one man’s shoulders?’

Three senior civil servants gave evidence this week, including the official who had responsibility for building regulations guidance on fire safety in the years before Grenfell. Peter Apps, Lucie Heath, Stephen Delahunty and Grainne Cuffe report

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Week 69: ‘It was just unthinkable. You had the makings here of a crisis you could not comprehend’

This week, civil servant Brian Martin gave his long-awaited evidence to the Grenfell Tower Inquiry. Peter Apps reports

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Week 70: ‘Show me the bodies’

An important week at the Grenfell Tower Inquiry saw a dramatic conclusion to the mammoth cross-examination of civil servant Brian Martin, as well as the first politicians. Peter Apps and Lucie Heath report

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Week 71: ‘I have changed my schedule to fit this in. I do have an extremely busy day meeting people’

Three politicians who were responsible for building regulations before Grenfell appeared before the inquiry this week, including the former communities secretary Eric Pickles, who responded to the coroner’s letter following the Lakanal House fire. Peter Apps and Lucie Heath report

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Module Four: aftermath

Week 72: 'The system isn't broken. It was built this way'

This week the inquiry turned to the shocking story of the lack of support for bereaved and survivors in the immediate aftermath of the Grenfell Tower fire. Peter Apps, Lucie Heath, Grainne Cuffe and Jack Simpson report

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Week 73: ‘Most people would regard that as hopeless’

This week, the Grenfell Tower Inquiry heard about the Royal Borough of Kensington and Chelsea’s chaotic response in the immediate aftermath of the blaze, from the staff responsible for it. Pete AppsStephen Delahunty and Grainne Cuffe report

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Week 74: ‘Do you agree that RBKC was ill-prepared and incapable to meet its duties’

This week, Nicholas Holgate, former chief executive of the Royal Borough of Kensington and Chelsea, was grilled on his failure to hand over control of the aftermath of the fire, despite the borough’s lack of capacity. Peter Apps reports

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Week 75: ‘It still shocks me to the core that that’s how we treat our citizens in this country’

This week the inquiry heard witnesses from the housing management body discuss their role in the aftermath of the Grenfell Tower fire, followed by a range of witnesses from other organisations which supported the response. Peter Apps and Grainne Cuffe report

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Week 76: ‘I fear this will become our New Orleans’

This week the inquiry heard from central government figures and members of the London-wide emergency response arrangements. Peter Apps and Grainne Cuffe report

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Week 77: ‘The planning wasn’t done and there was nothing for us to be drawing on’

The Grenfell Tower Inquiry’s examination of the aftermath of the fire concluded with witnesses from central government. Peter Apps reports

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Module seven: expert evidence and closing statements

Week 78: ‘The abandonment of the ‘stay put’ strategy for high-rise residential buildings is essential’

This week the Grenfell Tower Inquiry heard a range of expert witnesses discuss their reports. Peter Apps and Grainne Cuffe report

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Week 79: ‘You could argue the system was created to enable people to circumvent the rules’

The Grenfell Tower Inquiry continued to hear expert evidence this week, with two senior figures in the world of fire safety academia criticising the government’s approach before and after the blaze. Peter Apps and Grainne Cuffe report 

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Week 80: ‘The evidence points to wilful blindness and complacency towards safety’

As the inquiry moves into its final stages, lawyers for the key players gave statements about the evidence surrounding central government. Peter Apps reports

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Week 81: ‘This is Islamophobia. It’s racism. It is the elephant staring back at us in the room’

This week, closing statements covering the aftermath of the fire delivered a shocking new revelation and an expert toxicologist gave his views on the causes of the deaths. Peter Apps reports

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Module eight: further evidence relating to the deceased

Week 82: ‘Their chance to hear about the circumstances in which their loved ones died is the culmination of five years of waiting’

The Grenfell Tower Inquiry moved into its final module this week, with evidence relating to the circumstances in which the victims died. Peter Apps reports

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Week 83: ‘They died together as they lived: caring for one another’

A second week of evidence relating to the circumstances in which the victims of the fire died delivered more heartbreaking stories about their final moments. Peter Apps recaps

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Week 84: ‘Every decision affects someone who is an adored child, a beloved sister, a respected uncle, a needed mother’

The final week of oral evidence for the Grenfell Tower Inquiry’s second phase contained more heartbreaking evidence about the deaths in the tower. Peter Apps reports

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Closing statements

Week 85: ‘The merry-go-round turns still, the notes of its melody clearly audible in the last few days’

The Grenfell Tower Inquiry returned this week for closing statements from lawyers representing the bereaved and survivors and the various parties under scrutiny for the fire. Pete Apps reports.  

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