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Grenfell Tower Inquiry diary week 43: ‘Contractors at the time were not generally aware of the importance of leaving holes unsealed’

This week the inquiry focused on two of the more overlooked areas of the Grenfell Tower fire, with evidence focusing on the gas pipelines and lifts within the west London block. It was a packed week, with five witnesses giving evidence. Jack Simpson reports

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This week the inquiry focused on two of the more overlooked areas of the Grenfell Tower fire, with evidence focusing on the gas pipelines and lifts within the west London block #UKhousing

With module three coming to a close, the attention of the inquiry turned to some other aspects of the tower that have been given less of the inquiry’s attention, but that require discussion.

The week kicked off with evidence from James Harrison, head of London operations at Cadent at the time of the fire. Cadent gas, previously known as National Grid Gas Distribution, is a gas transporter company and was responsible for the infrastructure taking gas into Grenfell and its homes at the time of the fire.


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Back in 2016 after identifying a leak in one of the gas risers supplying flats in the tower, Cadent brought in contractor tRIIO to replace it. These works were never finished.

Tuesday saw Matthew Dolan, contract director at tRIIO, questioned about the project and how it may have helped the spread of smoke through the lobbies on the night of the fire, among other things.

Wednesday saw the inquiry bring in its expert gas witness Rodney Hancox to assess the riser work that had been carried out.

The week ended with evidence from two members of staff at Butler and Young, the lift consultants that were employed by Kensington and Chelsea Tenant Management Organisation (KCTMO) to design an upgrade to the lifts at the tower back in 2004.

The buried emergency valves

James Harrison, head of London operations at Cadent
James Harrison, head of London operations at Cadent

Before 2016, residents of Grenfell Tower were supplied through three gas pipelines, known as risers.

These were dubbed 'landlord’s supply', 'residential supply one', and 'residential supply two'. All of these risers had been installed in 1972, when the tower was first constructed.

A condition of all risers in high-rise blocks is that they include a pipeline isolation valve (PIV), which can be used in an emergency to shut off gas supply to a building. In all cases, these should be easily accessible near a building through a surface access box.

While falling debris would have made it harder to access these boxes on the night of the fire, when searched for, the PIVs could not be found for the ‘residential supply one’ or the ‘landlord’s supply’ pipes. Even stranger is the fact that these PIVs have still not been discovered in the four years since the fire.

So, what happened to them?

The consensus from those questioned this week is that work carried out during the refurbishment of the tower in 2014 saw the PIVs buried.

When asked about the lost PIVs, Mr Harrison said he believed that they were likely to have been built over during landscaping work that went alongside the re-cladding of the building.

This was a view supported by Mr Hancox, who had inspected and measured the block and predicted where the PIV was most likely to have been buried.

The PIVs definitely did exist, though. A survey in 2008 reported their existence for both pipes. And a survey in 2016, after the refurbishment, reported that the ‘residential supply one’ PIV was lost. There was no comment on the landlord supply.

While nobody can be certain that it was the refurbishment that buried them, both witnesses said there was a high probability.

Mr Hancox said that once it had been recognised that the PIV had been lost, Cadent should have acted quickly and reinstated a PIV into the line within six weeks.

The inability to access these PIVs had a big impact on the night. Cadent was only able to turn off the gas supply to the block at 11.40pm on 14 June – almost 24 hours after the fire started. This was only achieved by digging through concrete to access other supply lines and performing a complicated procedure called ‘bagging off’.

Evidence from Mr Hancox would show that in some flats, the continued supply of gas allowed fires to continue to burn for hours after much of the blaze had burned out. Only once it was isolated did flames in the tower finally die down.

Did the riser installation aid the spread of smoke?

Smoke stains within boxing-in (picture: Grenfell Inquiry)
Smoke stains within boxing-in (picture: Grenfell Inquiry)

In October 2016, a leak was discovered in the ‘residential supply two’ pipe. The gas was isolated and plans to replace the riser were drawn up.

The replacement job was entrusted to tRIIO. tRIIO was a joint venture between construction companies Skanska and Morrisons Utilities set up in 2013 for a contract with Cadent Gas to replace gas mains in London and the East of England. The contract ended this year.

In the case of Grenfell, the work involved installing the new gas riser from the basement and the roof. As part of this programme of work, holes would have to be drilled through walls to feed the piping through the stairwell to the lobbies and into flats.

The construction process was not straightforward.

Initial designs included plans to connect the various pipes through a welded and screwed technique.

According to the evidence given by Mr Dolan, one of its sub-contractors had instead installed flange joints at the connections. While quicker to install, flange joints are just screwed, which means that they more susceptible to leaks, and as a result have more stringent ventilation requirements.

To rectify this, tRIIO had to rethink the riser, and to overcome the new ventilation requirements it decided to ‘box in’ more of the piping. Boxing-in involves the riser being placed in a cavity covered by fire-retardant boards.

However, this boxing-in was not completed at the time of the fire.

The inquiry saw a series of images (above) from after the fire, which appear to show smokes stains under the boxing-in at various points, indicating that smoke may have spread through the holes.

So, should tRIIO have taken steps to address these holes while the project was going on?

Throughout his evidence on Tuesday, the inquiry heard from Mr Dolan about how tRIIO missed a number of opportunities in the design and construction process to address what impact its work might have on fire compartmentation. This included failing to consult any fire safety experts.

When asked why, Mr Dolan said: “The primary objective of the project was to try and get the gas back on, so we left holes within the fire compartmentation and therefore that presented a risk, we were aware of it, but the programme was that we were wanting to get the gas back on and then follow up with the boxing-in.”

Mr Hancox said he believed that steps should have been taken to fill the holes, particularly after they were warned by Cadent about the implication that incomplete work could have on fire safety. This was in reference to an email from Cadent’s Mary Ryan, in which she said that the incomplete work could lead to a “more unsafe situation” during a fire incident.

Mr Hancox said: “If they were advised by the client they should have done something, they should have gone to [KCTMO] and said that this work we feel had to be done, and I’m sure the TMO as a responsible and prudent operator would have done that.”

However, according to Mr Hancox this lack of engagement around fire safety was not just confined to the Grenfell project.

Responding to inquiry chair Sir Martin Moore-Bick on why contractors would not proactively act, he said: “I don’t believe at that time contractors were generally aware of the importance of not leaving those holes unsealed.”

Did Grenfell need a new riser?

Matthew Dolan, contract director at tRIIO at the time of the fire
Matthew Dolan, contract director at tRIIO at the time of the fire

While there is the possibility that holes and unfinished work may have contributed to smoke spread on the night of the fire, there is also a question of whether the project to replace the gas riser was needed at all.

Before deciding on the plan to run the riser from the basement through the lobby and into the stairwell, the TMO and Cadent had two other options for replacing the riser.

The first option was to run the line on the outside of the building, which was considered the simplest and safest method. However, this was rejected because of aesthetic reasons and the impact on the building’s new facade.

The second option was to carry out something called a buy-out.

A buy-out is an option available to gas transporters like Cadent, whereby they can opt against reinstalling a gas line because of concerns such as safety, and instead pay residents compensation. Residents will have to switch their appliances to electric after a buy-out.

Because of the difficulties in designing a riser that went through the interior of the building, a buy-out was seriously considered by the stakeholders in October and November 2016.

Mr Harrison said on Monday that Cadent had decided against this as an option because it was felt that it would not have got the acceptance from residents in the block.

But Mr Hancox said that he felt the buy-out option was the best, and most importantly safest, option on offer.

Expanding on his comments, he said that there was a reluctance throughout the gas industry to choose the buy-out option, even on the grounds of safety.

Mr Hancox said: “There has been a culture in the sector for years that if a gas supply is cut off it will be replaced come hook or by crook, even if that means non-compliance with current standard.

“That culture possibly needs to change.”

How to avoid a serious gas incident

Rodney Hancox gives evidence to the inquiry (picture: Grenfell Tower Inquiry)
Rodney Hancox gives evidence to the inquiry (picture: Grenfell Tower Inquiry)

Mr Hancox took to the witness box for the whole of Wednesday. The inquiry’s gas expert has 50 years of working in the industry and is one of the key contributors to the regulation bible for gas, IGEM/G/5.

While much of his evidence was focused solely on the supply lines at Grenfell, he was given two hours at the end of the day to run through his recommendations and outline how he feels gas safety in the country could be improved.

A key recommendation was his belief that it was imperative the country embark on a proactive programme to remove gas infrastructure in high-rise buildings that pre-dates 1973.

All of the gas risers in Grenfell Tower, before the replacement of residential supply two, were built in 1972 under an old system of regulation. This environment allowed gas pipes to be run straight into concrete walls and floors without sleeving. Sleeving is a plastic tube that runs the length of a gas pipe to protect it from things such as corrosion.

This regime also had much less stringent rules around the ventilation of pipes in high rises. Ventilation of pipes is essential for gas infrastructure as good ventilation allows air to mix with the gas in the event of the leak, keeping the gas to air content low, and reducing the chance of an explosion.

In early 1973, the Gas Act 1972 was made law. This not only saw the creation of British Gas but also brought in new regulations to make sleeving mandatory and require better ventilation standards.

Grenfell’s pipes had a lack of sleeving and poor ventilation in places, and according to Mr Hancox, there are many more buildings like it still in existence.

“To my knowledge there are a significant number of blocks of flats in London, Scotland Central Belt and other cities in the United Kingdom of similar vintage [to Grenfell], and with the same sleeving and ventilation issues as exhibited by residential gas supply number one,” he told the inquiry.

As part of his recommendations he called for gas transporters, the Health and Safety Executive and landlords up and down the country to identify high rises with infrastructure that pre-dates the 1973 legislation and replace, or buy out, these risers.

More shockingly, he believes that the failure of the industry to make a change to its predominantly reactive philosophy when it comes to replacing risers could result in a greater chance of a “serious gas incident”.

He pointed to a programme engaged by the government and British Gas in the 1970s when issues with three- inch and four-inch cast iron pipes had been seen as responsible for a number of high-profile explosions that had led to casualties.

After these incidents British Gas embarked on a major programme to remove all of these from domestic premises, with the organisation identifying the most at risk first. He said it provided a good analogy of what could be done, and what should be done, in response to Grenfell.

“I can see the similarities with what was happening then, incidents, and a reaction to the incident,” he said.

The ‘grave consequences’ of the lift upgrade

Ian Moorhouse, Butler and Young employee
Ian Moorhouse, Butler and Young employee

On Thursday, the attention turned to the lifts in Grenfell Tower. Butler & Young was appointed by KCTMO in 2004 to plan and design a major lift upgrade to the two lifts that served residents of the block.

The £600,000 upgrade would involve increasing the capacity of the lift from eight to 12 people and would increase the speed with which the lift would travel.

But should they have taken this opportunity to also upgrade it to a firefighting lift?

That was what much of the questioning of Stephen Ellis and Ian Moorhouse, both former employees of Butler & Young, focused on.

Firefighting lifts include a number of extra protective features, including a secondary power supply, water ingress protection and lift landing doors. A lack of this type of lift hindered firefighting operations on the night of the fire, with lawyers for the bereaved and survivors concluding that the failure to upgrade to firefighting standards had “grave consequences”.

Guidance at the time instructed that firefighting lifts be installed in all new high-rise buildings but there were not hard and fast rules for existing buildings.

Nevertheless, the inquiry presented excerpts from the report of its lift expert Roger Howkins during evidence on Thursday, in which he stated that he would have expected a “reasonably competent” lift consultant to have considered modernising the lift to meet firefighting lift requirements during the project’s design phase.

When asked on the back of this why a consideration of a firefighting lift was never raised or considered during the early phases of the lift upgrade, both Mr Moorhouse and Mr Ellis said that it had been.

Mr Moorhouse, the more senior of the two employees, claimed that he had repeatedly raised it in calls with the TMOs’s building services manager Dave Steppel but was told repeatedly not to consider a firefighting lift in the design.

He specifically pointed to a meeting with Mr Steppel in 2014. Reflecting on the meeting, he said: “There was not a lot of discussion around this because he was quite emphatic that fireman’s lifts were what were required.”

‘Fireman’s lifts’ include fewer protective features when compared to firefighting lifts and are also much cheaper. Both Mr Ellis and Mr Moorhouse estimated that a firefighting lift would have cost tens of thousands of pounds more to install when compared to a ‘fireman’s lift’. They said that hooking up a secondary power source alone would cost up to £100,000 extra.

No documentary evidence of Mr Steppel’s insistence against a firefighting lift has been found, and Mr Moorhouse’s initial statement said that he could not remember any discussion of the firefighting lifts.

It was included in his second statement, with Mr Moorhouse explaining this change by saying that he was given “food for thought” after receiving additional documentation and reading Mr Howkins’ report.

It is important to point out, though, that the ‘fireman’s lift’ did have a ‘fireman’s switch’ installed, a switch that allows fire services to take control of the lift in an emergency and prevent further use by occupants.

However, it appears to have failed on the night, meaning the London Fire Brigade was unable to take control of it. The phase one inquiry report stated that three residents – Ali Yawar Jafari, Mohamednur Tuccu and Khadija Khalloufi – died after getting into a lift around 30 minutes after the outbreak of the fire and it filling with smoke.

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Grenfell Tower Inquiry phase two: weekly diaries

Grenfell Tower Inquiry phase two: weekly diaries

Module one: the refurbishment

Week one: A vivid picture of a broken industry

After a week of damning revelations at the opening of phase two of the Grenfell Tower Inquiry, Peter Apps recaps the key points

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Week two: What is the significance of the immunity application?

Sir Martin Moore-Bick has written to the attorney general requesting protection for those set to give evidence at the Grenfell Tower Inquiry. Peter Apps explains what the move means

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Week three: Architects of misfortune

This week saw the lead architects for the Grenfell Tower refurbishment give evidence to the inquiry. Peter Apps runs through the key points

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Week four: ‘I didn’t have any perception that it was the monster it’s become’

The architects continued to give evidence this week, outlining a lack of understanding of the fire risk posed by the cladding materials and its design. Nathaniel Barker reports

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Week five: ‘No adverse effect in relation to external fire spread’

As the Grenfell Tower Inquiry returns from its long absence, Peter Apps recaps the key points from a week of important evidence from the fire consultants to the refurbishment

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Week six: ‘I can’t recall any instance where I discussed the materials with building control’

Nathaniel Barker summarises what we learned from fire engineers Exova, architects Studio E and the early evidence from contractor Rydon

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Week seven: ‘I do not think I have ever worked with a contractor operating with this level of nonchalance’

Two key witnesses from contractor Rydon gave evidence this week. Peter Apps recaps some of the key points from a revealing week of evidence

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Week eight: ‘It haunts me that it wasn't challenged’

Four witnesses from contractor Rydon gave evidence this week. Lucie Heath recaps what we learned on the last week of evidence before the inquiry breaks for five weeks

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Week nine: ‘All I can say is you will be taken out for a very nice meal very soon’

This week the inquiry heard evidence from witnesses at Harley Facades, the sub-contractor responsible for Grenfell Tower’s cladding. Peter Apps recaps the key points

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Week 10: ‘As we all know, ACM will be gone rather quickly in a fire!’

As the Grenfell Tower Inquiry entered its 10th week, Jack Simpson recaps the key points from a week of important evidence from the refurbishment’s cladding contractor

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Week 11: ‘Did you get the impression Grenfell Tower was a guinea pig for this insulation?’

With witnesses from the cladding subcontractor, the firm which cut the deadly panels to shape and the clerk of works which inspected the job giving evidence this was week full of revelations. Peter Apps recaps the key points

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Week 12: ‘Would you accept that was a serious failing on your part?’

With the surveyor who inspected Grenfell Tower for compliance giving evidence, this was a crucial week from the inquiry. Dominic Brady and Peter Apps report

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Week 13: ‘Value for money is to be regarded as the key driver for this project’

With consultants to Kensington & Chelsea Tenant Management Organisation (KCTMO) giving evidence, attention at the Grenfell Tower Inquiry turned for this first time to the actions of the TMO and the council. Peter Apps reports

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Week 14: ‘Did it not occur to you at this point that your budget was simply too low?’

This week, for the first time in phase two, the inquiry heard from Kensington & Chelsea Tenant Management Organisation, the landlord that oversaw the fatal refurbishment of Grenfell Tower. Lucie Heath reports

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Week 15: ‘Have you ever informed the police that you destroyed documents relevant to their investigation?’

Witnesses from the Kensington and Chelsea Tenant Management Organisation (KCTMO) gave evidence for a second week, which began with a shocking revelation about withheld and destroyed evidence. Peter Apps recaps

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Week 16: ‘I conclude this was very serious evidence of professional negligence’

This week saw members of Kensington & Chelsea Tenant Management Organisation finish giving evidence, before the inquiry’s expert witnesses took the stand to make some highly critical assessments of the work they had seen before and during the refurbishment of Grenfell Tower. Jack Simpson recaps

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Grenfell Tower: a timeline of the refurbishment

Following the conclusion of module one of the Grenfell Inquiry’s second phase, Peter Apps presents a timeline of the key moments during the fatal refurbishment of the west London tower block

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Module two: the cladding products

Week 17: ‘It’s hard to make a note about this because we are not clean’

The start of the second module of the Grenfell Tower Inquiry phase two came with some huge revelations about the companies that sold the products used in the cladding system. Peter Apps reports

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Week 18: ‘It was just reckless optimism wasn't it?’

As the inquiry began cross-examining witnesses for the second module of its phase two work, the picture surrounding just how Grenfell Tower ended up wrapped in such dangerous materials became a little clearer. Nathaniel Barker was keeping an eye on proceedings

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Week 19: ‘And that was intentional, deliberate, dishonest?’

The Grenfell Tower Inquiry this week heard the shocking story of how the insulation manufacturer “manipulated” official testing and marketed its product “dishonestly”. Peter Apps tells the story

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Week 20: ‘We were outed by a consultant who we then had to fabricate a story to’

This week the inquiry investigated the actions of Kingspan – the manufacturer of one of the insulation products used in the tower’s cladding system. Dominic Brady reports

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Week 21: ‘It’s there in black and white isn't it? We see a complete absence of any consideration of life safety’

The story of insulation giant Kingspan’s testing and marketing of its combustible insulation for high rises was unpacked in minute detail this week. Peter Apps reports

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Week 22: ‘All we do is lie in here’

In the third week of evidence from insulation giant Kingspan, the inquiry continued to uncover shocking details about the firm’s behaviour both before and after the Grenfell Tower fire. Lucie Heath reports

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Week 23: ‘That would have come as an earthquake to you at the time, would it not?’

This week the inquiry took its deepest dive yet into the inner workings of the cladding manufacturer whose product has been blamed for the terrible spread of fire up Grenfell Tower. Nathaniel Barker reports

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Week 24: ‘Do you accept that Test 5B was Arconic's deadly secret’

The president of the firm that made and sold the cladding panels installed on Grenfell Tower was asked to account for the apparent concealment of “disastrous” fire tests on the product this week. Peter Apps reports

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Week 25: ‘This is quite an incredible list of omissions and missed instances, isn’t it?’

This week the Grenfell Tower Inquiry heard its first witnesses from the Building Research Establishment (BRE) - the testing house which carried out key fire tests on the Kingspan and Celotex insulation products which were later used on Grenfell Tower. Peter Apps reports.

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Week 26: 'You were taking an enormous risk, weren't you?'

Week 26 at the Grenfell Tower Inquiry was a key moment in understanding how dangerous products used on the tower came to be accepted by industry professionals. Dominic Brady reports

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Week 27: ‘What will happen if one building made out [of] PE core is in fire and will kill 60 to 70 persons?’

The most explosive evidence this week at the Grenfell Tower Inquiry came from those who did not attend, as the evidence which would have been presented to Arconic witnesses was displayed in their absence. Peter Apps reports

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Week 28: ‘This is a serious safety matter’

This week the Grenfell Tower Inquiry zeroed in on the British Board of Agrément, the body that produced “misleading” certificates which inspired trust in both the cladding and insulation used on the tower. Lucie Heath reports

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Week 29:  ‘Is it true that Kingspan’s position… was to do its best to ensure that science was secretly perverted for financial gain?’

The final week in this section of the Grenfell Tower Inquiry primarily examined the attempts by insulation manufacturer Kingspan to lobby government after the fire. Peter Apps reports

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How the products used in Grenfell Tower's cladding system were tested and sold

As the section of the Grenfell Tower Inquiry examining how the products used in the cladding system were tested, marketed and sold comes to a close, Peter Apps summarises what we have learned about each of the products included in the system

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Module Three: the management of the tower

Week 30: ‘There is certainly a high probability that in the event of a fire the whole building can become an inferno’

The focus of the inquiry shifted this week to the actions of the social housing providers responsible for maintaining Grenfell Tower. Pete Apps recaps what we learned

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Week 31: ‘If we cannot get out people will die’

This week saw the former residents of Grenfell Tower enter the witness box to tell of their experiences attempting to raise complaints with the council and its managing agent. Pete Apps reports

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Week 32: ‘Let's hope our luck holds and there isn't a fire’

This week saw the return of the landlord of Grenfell Tower, Kensington and Chelsea Tenant Management Organisation (KCTMO), as senior staff members attempted to explain how vital fire safety protections at the block were allowed to fall into disrepair. Lucie Heath reports

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Week 33: ‘Isn't that a serious gap in the scope of a policy meant to safeguard vulnerable people?’

A slightly disjointed week at the Grenfell Tower inquiry saw further evidence from staff at building manager Kensington and Chelsea Tenant Management Organisation (KCTMO) interspersed with the views of a cladding expert. Peter Apps reports

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Week 34: ‘Some members of the community are doing their best to spread false information’

Jack Simpson covers all the major revelations from the past week of evidence at the Grenfell Inquiry, including evidence from Laura Johnson, director of housing at the Royal Borough of Kensington and Chelsea.

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Week 35: ‘I really didn’t like the champagne’ 

This week the Grenfell Tower Inquiry saw council witnesses, including former deputy leader Rock Feilding-Mellen and leader Nicholas Paget-Brown, questioned about their role in the story for the first time. Peter Apps reports

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Week 36: ‘Is that not a very incurious approach for a fire risk assessor?’

This week the Grenfell Tower Inquiry scrutinised the work of Carl Stokes, the man hired to carry out fire risk assessments for the block. Nathaniel Barker reports

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Week 37: ‘In giving that advice, weren’t you acting beyond your knowledge and expertise?’

A curtailed week at the Grenfell Tower Inquiry saw fire risk assessor Carl Stokes grilled over advice he gave regarding the tower’s cladding. Peter Apps reports

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Week 38: ‘Well it’s a bit more than that, isn’t it. He’s suggesting that you tell the LFB a lie’

The inquiry heard the mammoth cross-examination of KCTMO’s health and safety manager Janice Wray this week. Peter Apps reports

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Week 39: ‘What you said there was a grotesque understatement’

This week the inquiry continued to hear from former employees of Kensington and Chelsea Tenant Management Organisation, as well as two employees from the London Fire Brigade. Lucie Heath reports

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Week 40: ‘An exercise in concealment and half-truth’

Former KCTMO chief executive Robert Black gave his evidence to the inquiry this week and was asked to account for the various failures described over the previous six weeks. Peter Apps and Nathaniel Barker report.

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Week 41: ‘We should do nothing. This is not the sort of website we should be responding to’

This week saw the return of Robert Black, chief executive of Kensington and Chelsea Tenant Management Organisation (KCTMO), before the inquiry turned its attention to the defective smoke control system in the tower. Dominic Brady reports

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Week 42:‘They would leak as much as they leaked. They were what they were’

The Grenfell Tower Inquiry continued its in-depth investigation of the tower’s non-compliant smoke control system this week, with evidence from the various contractors involved in delivering it. Pete Apps reports 

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Week 43:‘Contractors at the time were not generally aware of the importance of leaving holes unsealed’

This week the inquiry focused on two of the more overlooked areas of the Grenfell Tower fire, with evidence focusing on the gas pipelines and lifts within the west London block. It was a packed week, with five witnesses giving evidence. Jack Simpson reports

Click here to read the full story

Week 44:‘I've never seen a fully compliant firefighting lift in any local authority building, to this day actually’

This week the inquiry turn the focus onto the building’s defective lifts, with evidence from an expert, contractors who worked on them and a former engineer at KCTMO. Pete Apps reports. 

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Week 45: ‘Don’t you find all this rather a surprising debate, given that the Equality Act was passed in 2010?’

The inquiry heard from expert witness Colin Todd this week, who gave his views about the work of risk assessor Carl Stokes as well as answered questions about his own guidance. Peter Apps and Nathaniel Barker report

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Week 46: ‘I think I've been very, very clear that is completely wrong’

This week the inquiry heard further expert evidence about fire risk assessor Carl Stokes’ actions, as the section of its work covering the management and maintenance of the tower concluded. Peter Apps reports

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Six key failures in the way Grenfell Tower was managed before the fire

Peter Apps recaps some of what we have learned about the actions of the Royal Borough of Kensington and Chelsea (RBKC) and Kensington and Chelsea Tenant Management Organisation (KCTMO) in the years before the fire.

Module one and two closing statements

Week 47: ‘An unedifying spectacle’

After a week of closing statements from the core participants involved in modules one and two, Lucie Heath recaps the key arguments of each group

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Module five: the fire brigade

Week 48: ‘They knew, and lives could and should have been saved’

The phase of the Grenfell Tower Inquiry examining the actions of the London Fire Brigade in the years before the fire kicked off this week with some major revelations. Peter Apps reports

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Week 49: ‘I'm not sure we've always taken every opportunity to learn as an organisation’

How the London Fire Brigade acted upon lessons from incidents in the years before the Grenfell Tower disaster came under the microscope this week at the public inquiry. Nathaniel Barker reports

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Week 50: ‘There is a culture in LFB that is very conservative. I think there is great comfort in what is familiar’

This week the inquiry heard how the London Fire Brigade (LFB) elected not to issue warnings about dangerous cladding before Grenfell and a detailed examination of its policy for checking high risk buildings. Pete Apps reports. 

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Week 51:‘We teach firefighters to expect building failure’

An unusually brief week of evidence at the Grenfell Tower Inquiry explored how a fire service neighbouring London was taking a different approach to tackling blazes in high rises. Nathaniel Barker reports

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Week 52: ‘I actually think that there is a measure of incompetence at all levels’

Expert evidence concluded the current section of the inquiry with some stinging criticism of the London Fire Brigade (LFB). Pete Apps and Grainne Cuffe report. 

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Module six: fire services

Week 53: ‘They make for chilling reading and harrowing listening’

The inquiry’s investigation into central government began this week with lawyers setting out their view on how and why firefighting policies failed. Peter Apps and Lucie Heath report

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Week 54: ‘Our consideration of evacuation at this time was something of a blind spot’

The development of policy on ‘stay put’, both nationally and for London, occupied the attention of the inquiry this week. Peter Apps reports

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Week 55: ‘My review is pretty scathing!’

In a week that included the 200th day of evidence in phase two of the inquiry, attention turned to the London Fire Brigade’s control room. Lucie Heath reports

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Week 56: ‘Why didn't we thump the table harder’

This week, the control room at the London Fire Brigade was examined further – both before and after the fire. Pete Apps and Lucie Heath report

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Week 57: ‘It was worse than slow, it was sluggish’

Former London Fire Brigade (LFB) commissioner Dany Cotton was the star witness this week, as the inquiry continued to delve into the brigade’s knowledge and training before the Grenfell Tower fire. Jack Simpson, Grainne Cuffe and Pete Apps report

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Week 58: ‘I don't think we deserve to ask for trust until we demonstrate different outcomes’

A current and former commissioner of the London Fire Brigade (LFB) wrapped up the inquiry’s investigation into the actions of the brigade before the fire. Grainne Cuffe and Peter Apps report.

Module six: testing and government 

One of the major scandals of our time: key revelations as the Grenfell Tower Inquiry turns to government

The government was accused of “covering up” the risks of dangerous cladding as its “unbridled passion for deregulation” left it a “junior party” to the construction industry as the latest phase of the public inquiry opened today. Peter Apps summarises some of the main points

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Week 59: ‘Recent tests have apparently shown it continued to burn for 20 minutes after the flame was taken away’

After shocking opening statements, the Grenfell Tower Inquiry turned its attention to the work of Local Authority Building Control. Pete Apps reports

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Week 60: ‘You could have an exact repeat of the Dubai fire in any number of buildings in London’

The Grenfell Tower Inquiry turned its attention to the work of the National House Building Council this week, with shocking revelations about the extent of the warnings issued to central government before the fire. Peter Apps reports

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Week 61: ‘Mistakes are meant for learning, not repeating’

In the first hearings of the new year, the Grenfell Tower Inquiry heard closing statements from the firefighting section of phase two. Lucie Heath reports

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Week 62: Did it ever occur to you that this act of collaboration was, in one sense, corrupting?

The Grenfell Tower Inquiry returned to the work of the National House Building Council (NHBC) this week, with a new shocking revelation about the government’s actions in the immediate aftermath of the fire. Peter Apps reports

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Week 63: ‘It came after the general move to deregulation. So more regulation was not welcome’

The government’s focus on deregulation before the Grenfell Tower fire was placed in the spotlight this week with a series of shocking revelations about its failure to amend fire safety guidance. Pete Apps and Grainne Cuffe report

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Week 64: ‘I didn’t think ACM would be suitable for use in any high-rise buildings. I don’t think anyone did’

This week, the Building Research Establishment’s Dr Sarah Colwell gave more than three days of evidence, with some huge revelations about what was known about the dangers of aluminium composite material years before the fire and the mass confusion over the government’s building regulations. Peter Apps and Jack Simpson report

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Week 65: ‘Unless the government does something now about ACM panels, people will die’

Further evidence from the Building Research Establishment and the first government witnesses added new depth to our understanding of how warnings were missed before the Grenfell Tower fire. Peter Apps reports 

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Week 66: ‘Was there a cover-up?’

The latest evidence from the Grenfell Tower Inquiry tracked the government’s failure to act on fire safety warnings right up until the months before the fire. Peter Apps and Grainne Cuffe report

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Week 67: ‘When exposed to a fire, the aluminium melts away and exposes the polyethylene. Whoosh!’

This week the inquiry heard disturbing new evidence about the failure of senior government officials to act on warnings about dangerous cladding in the years before the Grenfell Tower fire. Peter Apps reports

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Week 68: ‘Can we agree that was a pretty dangerous thing to have, all this falling on one man’s shoulders?’

Three senior civil servants gave evidence this week, including the official who had responsibility for building regulations guidance on fire safety in the years before Grenfell. Peter Apps, Lucie Heath, Stephen Delahunty and Grainne Cuffe report

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Week 69: ‘It was just unthinkable. You had the makings here of a crisis you could not comprehend’

This week, civil servant Brian Martin gave his long-awaited evidence to the Grenfell Tower Inquiry. Peter Apps reports

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Week 70: ‘Show me the bodies’

An important week at the Grenfell Tower Inquiry saw a dramatic conclusion to the mammoth cross-examination of civil servant Brian Martin, as well as the first politicians. Peter Apps and Lucie Heath report

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Week 71: ‘I have changed my schedule to fit this in. I do have an extremely busy day meeting people’

Three politicians who were responsible for building regulations before Grenfell appeared before the inquiry this week, including the former communities secretary Eric Pickles, who responded to the coroner’s letter following the Lakanal House fire. Peter Apps and Lucie Heath report

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Module Four: aftermath

Week 72: 'The system isn't broken. It was built this way'

This week the inquiry turned to the shocking story of the lack of support for bereaved and survivors in the immediate aftermath of the Grenfell Tower fire. Peter Apps, Lucie Heath, Grainne Cuffe and Jack Simpson report

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Week 73: ‘Most people would regard that as hopeless’

This week, the Grenfell Tower Inquiry heard about the Royal Borough of Kensington and Chelsea’s chaotic response in the immediate aftermath of the blaze, from the staff responsible for it. Pete AppsStephen Delahunty and Grainne Cuffe report

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Week 74: ‘Do you agree that RBKC was ill-prepared and incapable to meet its duties’

This week, Nicholas Holgate, former chief executive of the Royal Borough of Kensington and Chelsea, was grilled on his failure to hand over control of the aftermath of the fire, despite the borough’s lack of capacity. Peter Apps reports

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Week 75: ‘It still shocks me to the core that that’s how we treat our citizens in this country’

This week the inquiry heard witnesses from the housing management body discuss their role in the aftermath of the Grenfell Tower fire, followed by a range of witnesses from other organisations which supported the response. Peter Apps and Grainne Cuffe report

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Week 76: ‘I fear this will become our New Orleans’

This week the inquiry heard from central government figures and members of the London-wide emergency response arrangements. Peter Apps and Grainne Cuffe report

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Week 77: ‘The planning wasn’t done and there was nothing for us to be drawing on’

The Grenfell Tower Inquiry’s examination of the aftermath of the fire concluded with witnesses from central government. Peter Apps reports

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Module seven: expert evidence and closing statements

Week 78: ‘The abandonment of the ‘stay put’ strategy for high-rise residential buildings is essential’

This week the Grenfell Tower Inquiry heard a range of expert witnesses discuss their reports. Peter Apps and Grainne Cuffe report

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Week 79: ‘You could argue the system was created to enable people to circumvent the rules’

The Grenfell Tower Inquiry continued to hear expert evidence this week, with two senior figures in the world of fire safety academia criticising the government’s approach before and after the blaze. Peter Apps and Grainne Cuffe report 

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Week 80: ‘The evidence points to wilful blindness and complacency towards safety’

As the inquiry moves into its final stages, lawyers for the key players gave statements about the evidence surrounding central government. Peter Apps reports

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Week 81: ‘This is Islamophobia. It’s racism. It is the elephant staring back at us in the room’

This week, closing statements covering the aftermath of the fire delivered a shocking new revelation and an expert toxicologist gave his views on the causes of the deaths. Peter Apps reports

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Module eight: further evidence relating to the deceased

Week 82: ‘Their chance to hear about the circumstances in which their loved ones died is the culmination of five years of waiting’

The Grenfell Tower Inquiry moved into its final module this week, with evidence relating to the circumstances in which the victims died. Peter Apps reports

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Week 83: ‘They died together as they lived: caring for one another’

A second week of evidence relating to the circumstances in which the victims of the fire died delivered more heartbreaking stories about their final moments. Peter Apps recaps

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Week 84: ‘Every decision affects someone who is an adored child, a beloved sister, a respected uncle, a needed mother’

The final week of oral evidence for the Grenfell Tower Inquiry’s second phase contained more heartbreaking evidence about the deaths in the tower. Peter Apps reports

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Closing statements

Week 85: ‘The merry-go-round turns still, the notes of its melody clearly audible in the last few days’

The Grenfell Tower Inquiry returned this week for closing statements from lawyers representing the bereaved and survivors and the various parties under scrutiny for the fire. Pete Apps reports.  

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