Government official ‘lulled seniors into false sense of security’ about risk of cladding fire before Grenfell
A government official has accepted he “lulled” his seniors into “a false sense of security” about the risk of a major cladding fire in the UK two years before the Grenfell Tower blaze.
Brian Martin, who had responsibility for guidance on building regulations and fire safety in the years before the fire in June 2017, was grilled today about emails he sent relating to the risk of a cladding fire occurring in this country after a series of incidents in the Middle East.
In February 2015, Peter Holland, then the government’s chief fire and rescue advisor, had emailed Mr Martin in reference to a huge blaze at The Torch tower in Dubai which had involved aluminium composite material (ACM) cladding – the same violently combustible material which was later installed on Grenfell Tower.
Mr Martin replied saying “there are provisions in the building regulations designed to prevent this” so such a fire “shouldn’t be a problem in the UK”. He added that there were “no guarantees”.
However, he did not mention to Mr Holland that he had been specifically warned at a meeting just six months earlier that the guidance he was responsible for was “not clear” in banning this product and required “clarification” to ensure the material was not used.
The meeting – involving a cross-section of senior industry representatives – had resulted in a recommendation that he should provide a ‘frequently asked question’ to make it clear that this material shouldn’t be used. He told the inquiry yesterday that he could have done this but “forgot” because he was “busy on other things”.
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Asked why he did not mention the lack of clarity in the guidance to Mr Holland, he said: “I accept it would have been better to… bring that more to the front than perhaps I did at the time.”
“I suggest to you, you gave him an answer which lulled him and others on the email chain into a false sense of security,” said Richard Millett QC, counsel to the inquiry. “You weren’t candid with them.”
“I think that’s perhaps a fair accusation, or criticism,” replied Mr Martin.
In June 2015, he exchanged further emails with Steve Evans, a senior technical manager at the National House Building Council (NHBC), the UK’s largest building control inspector.
Mr Evans told Mr Martin that there was “a difference of opinion in the industry” about a crucial passage in the guidance which Mr Martin says was intended to ban the use of ACM.
Asked by Mr Millett if the presence of this “difference of opinion” in the industry meant “the assurance that you’ve given to Peter Holland was baseless” and that a repeat of the Dubai fire “could certainly have happened” in the UK, Mr Martin said: “I didn’t think of it in those terms, but I can see the point you’re making.”
In January 2016, following yet another fire in Dubai, Mr Martin emailed colleagues to describe the risks posed by ACM.
“This stuff [is] very rigid and makes nice shiny buildings. Sadly, when it gets exposed to a fire, the aluminium melts away and exposes the polyethylene core. Whoosh!” he wrote.
“Had you taken any steps to find out anything about the way in which ACM panels… might be being used in the UK?” asked Mr Millett.
“No,” replied Mr Martin.
Asked why he had not produced anything to clarify the guidance, he said: “I didn’t have an opportunity to produce a new guidance document. That’s what I was trying to get started at this time. And it was impossible to get anything done at that point in government. It was ridiculous.”
As the inquiry has seen previously, an industry conference was held in the same month where a cladding supplier called Nick Jenkins warned that ACM was being sold widely in the UK because of a widely held perception that it was permitted by guidance.
He told the conference: “You could have an exact repeat of the Dubai fire in any number of buildings we supply products to in London.”
Mr Martin was not at the conference, but Mr Millett asked if the exchange “exposes in stark terms the danger posed by the long-running ambiguity” in the guidance which he had “failed to resolve despite more than two years of discussion about it”.
“Yes,” replied Mr Martin.
Asked whether he should have been aware that ACM was being widely used, he said: “The division [responsible for building regulations] had shrunk considerably over the years because they didn’t want us to interfere with the industry.
“That’s why we didn’t have any mechanism to know what was going on unless someone brought it to our attention. And even then, we had quite limited options to do something about it.”
Mr Jenkins then emailed Mr Martin in February 2016 specifically to raise the issue – which related to the interpretation of the words “filler material” in the official government guidance, Approved Document B.
Mr Martin has told the inquiry he added this phrase in 2005 following a cladding fire in Manchester, and intended it to apply to the combustible core of a cladding panel.
But he never consulted on this meaning, provided a definition or drew it to industry’s attention. It was included in Paragraph 12.7, under a heading marked ‘insulation materials/products’, which led many to assume its application was limited to insulation.
In response to Mr Jenkins, Mr Martin said ‘filler’ “could reasonably be considered” to apply to the core of a cladding panel, but added: “If the designer and building control body choose to do something else, that’s up to them.”
Mr Martin said that he had been “encouraged always to be very cautious” about giving specific instruction on the compliance of particular products, “so we always tended to use this kind of language”.
“Is there a deeper truth here that in fact one of the reasons, or the reason, you didn’t do so is because you knew the word ‘filler’ had not only not been defined, but that it hadn’t been checked with industry. It had been snuck in under the radar at the last minute and now you realised it was controversial and had created a legacy of dangerously non-compliant Dubai-style buildings here in the UK?” asked Mr Millett.
“I don’t think that’s what I was thinking,” said Mr Martin.
The inquiry has previously seen that Mr Jenkins responded to tell Mr Martin of his “grave concern” that the number of buildings using ACM in the UK was “many and growing”, which has previously been described as a “red alert” warning.
Mr Martin will be asked about this email when he returns to give evidence on Monday.
‘You gave him an answer which would lull him into a false sense of security’: the full exchange
Richard Millett QC (pictured above): Your statement to the chief fire and rescue advisor that The Torch fire couldn’t happen here was an assurance that you gave him with your fingers crossed, knowing very well that there was at least a significant portion of the [Approved Document B] readership who did not understand [Paragraph] 12.7 to extend the requirement of materials of limited combustibility to the core of a rainscreen panel.
Brian Martin: I didn’t say it couldn’t happen. I said it shouldn’t happen and I said that there were no guarantees.
Mr Millett: That’s hardly sending the message, is it, to Peter Holland that there is a sizeable chunk of the building industry who does not think, or did not think for some years, that the core of a composite rainscreen panel needed to be of limited compatibility?
Mr Martin: I accept it would have been better to… bring that more to the front than perhaps I did at the time.
Mr Millett: But it’s worse, isn’t it, because by not doing that, do you accept that you lulled him and others reading this into a false sense of security?
Mr Martin: I don’t know, Mr Holland was a very experienced firefighter. So he would have been well aware that non-compliance would have an impact on fire safety from time to time. He would have experienced fires where fire spread was a result of non-compliance with building regulations.
Mr Millett: [But] he wasn’t at the meeting and he wouldn’t have necessarily understood the controversy about the meaning of 12.7.
Mr Martin: No.
Mr Millett: And unless you’d alerted him to that, there’s nothing that he would have known so that he could understand that the building regulations were controversial, that [Approved Document B] was controversial. And so, therefore, that’s why I suggest to you, you gave him an answer which lulled him and others on the email chain into a false sense of security. You weren’t candid with them and told them up front what the problem was.
Mr Martin: I think that’s perhaps a fair accusation, or criticism.
Earlier, he was asked about industry guidance published by the Building Control Alliance (BCA) in summer 2014, which said all materials in a cladding system had to meet the tough fire standard of “limited combustibility”, unless they had passed a large-scale test or been approved by an expert through a ‘desktop study’.
Mr Martin accepted that the BCA guidance “went further” than the standards set in Approved Document B on this point and “provided a much more straightforward and safer approach”, said Mr Martin.
Asked why he did not alter the official guidance to match the stronger provisions in the industry note, he said: “We were about to start work on a review of Approved Document B. So this was something which got that message across sooner than I was able to.”
He added: “The mantra of the department was very much about localism. It was about saying it should be the industry and local bodies that lead on these issues with minimum government intervention. So that was how the department has been progressively behaving, right across the board because of the fact that we were less people, less resources and less money… Getting other organisations to do this kind of thing is exactly what they wanted us to do.”
“Is it the case that you, as a result of that culture, didn't think that you were the custodian of public safety? And these other organisations, NHBC, BCA, even the manufacturers, should take that off your hands. Was that your thinking?” asked Mr Millett.
“I think in part, yes. I think that was how we were encouraged to work,” said Mr Martin.
The same industry guidance note legitimised the use of ‘desktop studies’ – assessments of systems containing combustible insulation which had not been tested.
Mr Martin was asked why he had trusted the NHBC to help draft this guidance, given that he knew by this point that its inspectors had been signing off such combustible combinations for many years before its publication.
Asked if he felt this might give them “some motivation to legitimise” the use of such products “retrospectively”, Mr Martin said: “I regarded them as being responsible professionals and took the view that they will take an appropriate approach to this question… I thought they were decent people doing their best to get something right.”
“Does that tell us that you never actually approached what the NHBC was telling you critically, you never scrutinised them, never read between the lines? You just trusted them?” asked Mr Millett.
“I think I did, yes,” said Mr Martin.
The inquiry continues on Monday with further evidence from Mr Martin.
Who is Brian Martin?
Brian Martin had been responsible for official building regulations guidance on fire safety, contained in Approved Document B, for almost 18 years by the time of the Grenfell Tower fire.
He was the person within the department “to whom others would turn” to answer questions on this topic.
When she gave evidence, Melanie Dawes, the former permanent secretary at the Department for Communities and Local Government (DCLG), was asked if it was “pretty dangerous” to have the responsibility for all this “falling on one man’s shoulders”.
“Yes, I do. I think it ’s a single point of failure that had been allowed to be created,” she said. Asked to explain how this happened, she said it reflected budget cuts, the localism agenda and the fact that “regulation was not seen as something valuable, it was seen as something that created costs and burdens”.
Mr Martin has no formal fire safety or engineering qualifications. His qualifications amounted to a diploma in building control surveying obtained around 25 years ago.
He had trained as a joiner and carpenter after leaving school, before rising to site manager. Asked if this gave him any fire safety experience, he said: “I would have installed some fire doors.”
Aged 22, he became a building control surveyor, working first for Westminster, Tower Hamlets and Dartford councils, and did review fire strategies for some complex projects, including the Bluewater shopping centre in Kent.
In 1999, he applied for a job at the Building Research Establishment (BRE), the former national testing centre which had recently been privatised. The BRE had a contract to support the government with a review of Approved Document B and within weeks of starting, Mr Martin was seconded to the department’s offices for two to three days a week to support this work.
Mr Martin would go on to take a permanent role at the department in 2008 as ‘principal construction professional’. This saw him take on primary responsibility for Approved Document B. The inquiry has already heard about many critical warnings regarding the looming danger of a cladding fire which were issued to him in this role.
In November 2017, five months after the Grenfell fire, he was promoted to head of technical policy, leading the team of specialists who oversaw changes to building regulations and guidance.
However, in September last year he moved to the planning directorate. He said he had been “encouraged” to find a new role given “the challenges associated with my attendance at the inquiry and the attention I was getting in the press”.
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Grenfell Tower Inquiry phase two: weekly diaries
Module one: the refurbishment
Week one: A vivid picture of a broken industry
After a week of damning revelations at the opening of phase two of the Grenfell Tower Inquiry, Peter Apps recaps the key points
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Week two: What is the significance of the immunity application?
Sir Martin Moore-Bick has written to the attorney general requesting protection for those set to give evidence at the Grenfell Tower Inquiry. Peter Apps explains what the move means
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Week three: Architects of misfortune
This week saw the lead architects for the Grenfell Tower refurbishment give evidence to the inquiry. Peter Apps runs through the key points
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Week four: ‘I didn’t have any perception that it was the monster it’s become’
The architects continued to give evidence this week, outlining a lack of understanding of the fire risk posed by the cladding materials and its design. Nathaniel Barker reports
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Week five: ‘No adverse effect in relation to external fire spread’
As the Grenfell Tower Inquiry returns from its long absence, Peter Apps recaps the key points from a week of important evidence from the fire consultants to the refurbishment
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Week six: ‘I can’t recall any instance where I discussed the materials with building control’
Nathaniel Barker summarises what we learned from fire engineers Exova, architects Studio E and the early evidence from contractor Rydon
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Week seven: ‘I do not think I have ever worked with a contractor operating with this level of nonchalance’
Two key witnesses from contractor Rydon gave evidence this week. Peter Apps recaps some of the key points from a revealing week of evidence
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Week eight: ‘It haunts me that it wasn't challenged’
Four witnesses from contractor Rydon gave evidence this week. Lucie Heath recaps what we learned on the last week of evidence before the inquiry breaks for five weeks
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Week nine: ‘All I can say is you will be taken out for a very nice meal very soon’
This week the inquiry heard evidence from witnesses at Harley Facades, the sub-contractor responsible for Grenfell Tower’s cladding. Peter Apps recaps the key points
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Week 10: ‘As we all know, ACM will be gone rather quickly in a fire!’
As the Grenfell Tower Inquiry entered its 10th week, Jack Simpson recaps the key points from a week of important evidence from the refurbishment’s cladding contractor
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Week 11: ‘Did you get the impression Grenfell Tower was a guinea pig for this insulation?’
With witnesses from the cladding subcontractor, the firm which cut the deadly panels to shape and the clerk of works which inspected the job giving evidence this was week full of revelations. Peter Apps recaps the key points
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Week 12: ‘Would you accept that was a serious failing on your part?’
With the surveyor who inspected Grenfell Tower for compliance giving evidence, this was a crucial week from the inquiry. Dominic Brady and Peter Apps report
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Week 13: ‘Value for money is to be regarded as the key driver for this project’
With consultants to Kensington & Chelsea Tenant Management Organisation (KCTMO) giving evidence, attention at the Grenfell Tower Inquiry turned for this first time to the actions of the TMO and the council. Peter Apps reports
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Week 14: ‘Did it not occur to you at this point that your budget was simply too low?’
This week, for the first time in phase two, the inquiry heard from Kensington & Chelsea Tenant Management Organisation, the landlord that oversaw the fatal refurbishment of Grenfell Tower. Lucie Heath reports
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Week 15: ‘Have you ever informed the police that you destroyed documents relevant to their investigation?’
Witnesses from the Kensington and Chelsea Tenant Management Organisation (KCTMO) gave evidence for a second week, which began with a shocking revelation about withheld and destroyed evidence. Peter Apps recaps
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Week 16: ‘I conclude this was very serious evidence of professional negligence’
This week saw members of Kensington & Chelsea Tenant Management Organisation finish giving evidence, before the inquiry’s expert witnesses took the stand to make some highly critical assessments of the work they had seen before and during the refurbishment of Grenfell Tower. Jack Simpson recaps
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Grenfell Tower: a timeline of the refurbishment
Following the conclusion of module one of the Grenfell Inquiry’s second phase, Peter Apps presents a timeline of the key moments during the fatal refurbishment of the west London tower block
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Module two: the cladding products
Week 17: ‘It’s hard to make a note about this because we are not clean’
The start of the second module of the Grenfell Tower Inquiry phase two came with some huge revelations about the companies that sold the products used in the cladding system. Peter Apps reports
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Week 18: ‘It was just reckless optimism wasn't it?’
As the inquiry began cross-examining witnesses for the second module of its phase two work, the picture surrounding just how Grenfell Tower ended up wrapped in such dangerous materials became a little clearer. Nathaniel Barker was keeping an eye on proceedings
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Week 19: ‘And that was intentional, deliberate, dishonest?’
The Grenfell Tower Inquiry this week heard the shocking story of how the insulation manufacturer “manipulated” official testing and marketed its product “dishonestly”. Peter Apps tells the story
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Week 20: ‘We were outed by a consultant who we then had to fabricate a story to’
This week the inquiry investigated the actions of Kingspan – the manufacturer of one of the insulation products used in the tower’s cladding system. Dominic Brady reports
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Week 21: ‘It’s there in black and white isn't it? We see a complete absence of any consideration of life safety’
The story of insulation giant Kingspan’s testing and marketing of its combustible insulation for high rises was unpacked in minute detail this week. Peter Apps reports
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Week 22: ‘All we do is lie in here’
In the third week of evidence from insulation giant Kingspan, the inquiry continued to uncover shocking details about the firm’s behaviour both before and after the Grenfell Tower fire. Lucie Heath reports
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Week 23: ‘That would have come as an earthquake to you at the time, would it not?’
This week the inquiry took its deepest dive yet into the inner workings of the cladding manufacturer whose product has been blamed for the terrible spread of fire up Grenfell Tower. Nathaniel Barker reports
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Week 24: ‘Do you accept that Test 5B was Arconic's deadly secret’
The president of the firm that made and sold the cladding panels installed on Grenfell Tower was asked to account for the apparent concealment of “disastrous” fire tests on the product this week. Peter Apps reports
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Week 25: ‘This is quite an incredible list of omissions and missed instances, isn’t it?’
This week the Grenfell Tower Inquiry heard its first witnesses from the Building Research Establishment (BRE) - the testing house which carried out key fire tests on the Kingspan and Celotex insulation products which were later used on Grenfell Tower. Peter Apps reports.
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Week 26: 'You were taking an enormous risk, weren't you?'
Week 26 at the Grenfell Tower Inquiry was a key moment in understanding how dangerous products used on the tower came to be accepted by industry professionals. Dominic Brady reports
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Week 27: ‘What will happen if one building made out [of] PE core is in fire and will kill 60 to 70 persons?’
The most explosive evidence this week at the Grenfell Tower Inquiry came from those who did not attend, as the evidence which would have been presented to Arconic witnesses was displayed in their absence. Peter Apps reports
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Week 28: ‘This is a serious safety matter’
This week the Grenfell Tower Inquiry zeroed in on the British Board of Agrément, the body that produced “misleading” certificates which inspired trust in both the cladding and insulation used on the tower. Lucie Heath reports
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Week 29: ‘Is it true that Kingspan’s position… was to do its best to ensure that science was secretly perverted for financial gain?’
The final week in this section of the Grenfell Tower Inquiry primarily examined the attempts by insulation manufacturer Kingspan to lobby government after the fire. Peter Apps reports
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How the products used in Grenfell Tower's cladding system were tested and sold
As the section of the Grenfell Tower Inquiry examining how the products used in the cladding system were tested, marketed and sold comes to a close, Peter Apps summarises what we have learned about each of the products included in the system
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Module Three: the management of the tower
Week 30: ‘There is certainly a high probability that in the event of a fire the whole building can become an inferno’
The focus of the inquiry shifted this week to the actions of the social housing providers responsible for maintaining Grenfell Tower. Pete Apps recaps what we learned
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Week 31: ‘If we cannot get out people will die’
This week saw the former residents of Grenfell Tower enter the witness box to tell of their experiences attempting to raise complaints with the council and its managing agent. Pete Apps reports
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Week 32: ‘Let's hope our luck holds and there isn't a fire’
This week saw the return of the landlord of Grenfell Tower, Kensington and Chelsea Tenant Management Organisation (KCTMO), as senior staff members attempted to explain how vital fire safety protections at the block were allowed to fall into disrepair. Lucie Heath reports
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Week 33: ‘Isn't that a serious gap in the scope of a policy meant to safeguard vulnerable people?’
A slightly disjointed week at the Grenfell Tower inquiry saw further evidence from staff at building manager Kensington and Chelsea Tenant Management Organisation (KCTMO) interspersed with the views of a cladding expert. Peter Apps reports
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Week 34: ‘Some members of the community are doing their best to spread false information’
Jack Simpson covers all the major revelations from the past week of evidence at the Grenfell Inquiry, including evidence from Laura Johnson, director of housing at the Royal Borough of Kensington and Chelsea.
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Week 35: ‘I really didn’t like the champagne’
This week the Grenfell Tower Inquiry saw council witnesses, including former deputy leader Rock Feilding-Mellen and leader Nicholas Paget-Brown, questioned about their role in the story for the first time. Peter Apps reports
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Week 36: ‘Is that not a very incurious approach for a fire risk assessor?’
This week the Grenfell Tower Inquiry scrutinised the work of Carl Stokes, the man hired to carry out fire risk assessments for the block. Nathaniel Barker reports
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Week 37: ‘In giving that advice, weren’t you acting beyond your knowledge and expertise?’
A curtailed week at the Grenfell Tower Inquiry saw fire risk assessor Carl Stokes grilled over advice he gave regarding the tower’s cladding. Peter Apps reports
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Week 38: ‘Well it’s a bit more than that, isn’t it. He’s suggesting that you tell the LFB a lie’
The inquiry heard the mammoth cross-examination of KCTMO’s health and safety manager Janice Wray this week. Peter Apps reports
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Week 39: ‘What you said there was a grotesque understatement’
This week the inquiry continued to hear from former employees of Kensington and Chelsea Tenant Management Organisation, as well as two employees from the London Fire Brigade. Lucie Heath reports
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Week 40: ‘An exercise in concealment and half-truth’
Former KCTMO chief executive Robert Black gave his evidence to the inquiry this week and was asked to account for the various failures described over the previous six weeks. Peter Apps and Nathaniel Barker report.
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Week 41: ‘We should do nothing. This is not the sort of website we should be responding to’
This week saw the return of Robert Black, chief executive of Kensington and Chelsea Tenant Management Organisation (KCTMO), before the inquiry turned its attention to the defective smoke control system in the tower. Dominic Brady reports
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Week 42:‘They would leak as much as they leaked. They were what they were’
The Grenfell Tower Inquiry continued its in-depth investigation of the tower’s non-compliant smoke control system this week, with evidence from the various contractors involved in delivering it. Pete Apps reports
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Week 43:‘Contractors at the time were not generally aware of the importance of leaving holes unsealed’
This week the inquiry focused on two of the more overlooked areas of the Grenfell Tower fire, with evidence focusing on the gas pipelines and lifts within the west London block. It was a packed week, with five witnesses giving evidence. Jack Simpson reports
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Week 44:‘I've never seen a fully compliant firefighting lift in any local authority building, to this day actually’
This week the inquiry turn the focus onto the building’s defective lifts, with evidence from an expert, contractors who worked on them and a former engineer at KCTMO. Pete Apps reports.
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Week 45: ‘Don’t you find all this rather a surprising debate, given that the Equality Act was passed in 2010?’
The inquiry heard from expert witness Colin Todd this week, who gave his views about the work of risk assessor Carl Stokes as well as answered questions about his own guidance. Peter Apps and Nathaniel Barker report
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Week 46: ‘I think I've been very, very clear that is completely wrong’
This week the inquiry heard further expert evidence about fire risk assessor Carl Stokes’ actions, as the section of its work covering the management and maintenance of the tower concluded. Peter Apps reports
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Six key failures in the way Grenfell Tower was managed before the fire
Peter Apps recaps some of what we have learned about the actions of the Royal Borough of Kensington and Chelsea (RBKC) and Kensington and Chelsea Tenant Management Organisation (KCTMO) in the years before the fire.
Module one and two closing statements
Week 47: ‘An unedifying spectacle’
After a week of closing statements from the core participants involved in modules one and two, Lucie Heath recaps the key arguments of each group
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Module five: the fire brigade
Week 48: ‘They knew, and lives could and should have been saved’
The phase of the Grenfell Tower Inquiry examining the actions of the London Fire Brigade in the years before the fire kicked off this week with some major revelations. Peter Apps reports
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Week 49: ‘I'm not sure we've always taken every opportunity to learn as an organisation’
How the London Fire Brigade acted upon lessons from incidents in the years before the Grenfell Tower disaster came under the microscope this week at the public inquiry. Nathaniel Barker reports
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Week 50: ‘There is a culture in LFB that is very conservative. I think there is great comfort in what is familiar’
This week the inquiry heard how the London Fire Brigade (LFB) elected not to issue warnings about dangerous cladding before Grenfell and a detailed examination of its policy for checking high risk buildings. Pete Apps reports.
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Week 51:‘We teach firefighters to expect building failure’
An unusually brief week of evidence at the Grenfell Tower Inquiry explored how a fire service neighbouring London was taking a different approach to tackling blazes in high rises. Nathaniel Barker reports
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Week 52: ‘I actually think that there is a measure of incompetence at all levels’
Expert evidence concluded the current section of the inquiry with some stinging criticism of the London Fire Brigade (LFB). Pete Apps and Grainne Cuffe report.
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Module six: fire services
Week 53: ‘They make for chilling reading and harrowing listening’
The inquiry’s investigation into central government began this week with lawyers setting out their view on how and why firefighting policies failed. Peter Apps and Lucie Heath report
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Week 54: ‘Our consideration of evacuation at this time was something of a blind spot’
The development of policy on ‘stay put’, both nationally and for London, occupied the attention of the inquiry this week. Peter Apps reports
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Week 55: ‘My review is pretty scathing!’
In a week that included the 200th day of evidence in phase two of the inquiry, attention turned to the London Fire Brigade’s control room. Lucie Heath reports
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Week 56: ‘Why didn't we thump the table harder’
This week, the control room at the London Fire Brigade was examined further – both before and after the fire. Pete Apps and Lucie Heath report
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Week 57: ‘It was worse than slow, it was sluggish’
Former London Fire Brigade (LFB) commissioner Dany Cotton was the star witness this week, as the inquiry continued to delve into the brigade’s knowledge and training before the Grenfell Tower fire. Jack Simpson, Grainne Cuffe and Pete Apps report
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Week 58: ‘I don't think we deserve to ask for trust until we demonstrate different outcomes’
A current and former commissioner of the London Fire Brigade (LFB) wrapped up the inquiry’s investigation into the actions of the brigade before the fire. Grainne Cuffe and Peter Apps report.
Module six: testing and government
One of the major scandals of our time: key revelations as the Grenfell Tower Inquiry turns to government
The government was accused of “covering up” the risks of dangerous cladding as its “unbridled passion for deregulation” left it a “junior party” to the construction industry as the latest phase of the public inquiry opened today. Peter Apps summarises some of the main points
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Week 59: ‘Recent tests have apparently shown it continued to burn for 20 minutes after the flame was taken away’
After shocking opening statements, the Grenfell Tower Inquiry turned its attention to the work of Local Authority Building Control. Pete Apps reports
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Week 60: ‘You could have an exact repeat of the Dubai fire in any number of buildings in London’
The Grenfell Tower Inquiry turned its attention to the work of the National House Building Council this week, with shocking revelations about the extent of the warnings issued to central government before the fire. Peter Apps reports
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Week 61: ‘Mistakes are meant for learning, not repeating’
In the first hearings of the new year, the Grenfell Tower Inquiry heard closing statements from the firefighting section of phase two. Lucie Heath reports
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Week 62: Did it ever occur to you that this act of collaboration was, in one sense, corrupting?
The Grenfell Tower Inquiry returned to the work of the National House Building Council (NHBC) this week, with a new shocking revelation about the government’s actions in the immediate aftermath of the fire. Peter Apps reports
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Week 63: ‘It came after the general move to deregulation. So more regulation was not welcome’
The government’s focus on deregulation before the Grenfell Tower fire was placed in the spotlight this week with a series of shocking revelations about its failure to amend fire safety guidance. Pete Apps and Grainne Cuffe report
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Week 64: ‘I didn’t think ACM would be suitable for use in any high-rise buildings. I don’t think anyone did’
This week, the Building Research Establishment’s Dr Sarah Colwell gave more than three days of evidence, with some huge revelations about what was known about the dangers of aluminium composite material years before the fire and the mass confusion over the government’s building regulations. Peter Apps and Jack Simpson report
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Week 65: ‘Unless the government does something now about ACM panels, people will die’
Further evidence from the Building Research Establishment and the first government witnesses added new depth to our understanding of how warnings were missed before the Grenfell Tower fire. Peter Apps reports
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Week 66: ‘Was there a cover-up?’
The latest evidence from the Grenfell Tower Inquiry tracked the government’s failure to act on fire safety warnings right up until the months before the fire. Peter Apps and Grainne Cuffe report
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Week 67: ‘When exposed to a fire, the aluminium melts away and exposes the polyethylene. Whoosh!’
This week the inquiry heard disturbing new evidence about the failure of senior government officials to act on warnings about dangerous cladding in the years before the Grenfell Tower fire. Peter Apps reports
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Week 68: ‘Can we agree that was a pretty dangerous thing to have, all this falling on one man’s shoulders?’
Three senior civil servants gave evidence this week, including the official who had responsibility for building regulations guidance on fire safety in the years before Grenfell. Peter Apps, Lucie Heath, Stephen Delahunty and Grainne Cuffe report
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Week 69: ‘It was just unthinkable. You had the makings here of a crisis you could not comprehend’
This week, civil servant Brian Martin gave his long-awaited evidence to the Grenfell Tower Inquiry. Peter Apps reports
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Week 70: ‘Show me the bodies’
An important week at the Grenfell Tower Inquiry saw a dramatic conclusion to the mammoth cross-examination of civil servant Brian Martin, as well as the first politicians. Peter Apps and Lucie Heath report
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Week 71: ‘I have changed my schedule to fit this in. I do have an extremely busy day meeting people’
Three politicians who were responsible for building regulations before Grenfell appeared before the inquiry this week, including the former communities secretary Eric Pickles, who responded to the coroner’s letter following the Lakanal House fire. Peter Apps and Lucie Heath report
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Module Four: aftermath
Week 72: 'The system isn't broken. It was built this way'
This week the inquiry turned to the shocking story of the lack of support for bereaved and survivors in the immediate aftermath of the Grenfell Tower fire. Peter Apps, Lucie Heath, Grainne Cuffe and Jack Simpson report
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Week 73: ‘Most people would regard that as hopeless’
This week, the Grenfell Tower Inquiry heard about the Royal Borough of Kensington and Chelsea’s chaotic response in the immediate aftermath of the blaze, from the staff responsible for it. Pete Apps, Stephen Delahunty and Grainne Cuffe report
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Week 74: ‘Do you agree that RBKC was ill-prepared and incapable to meet its duties’
This week, Nicholas Holgate, former chief executive of the Royal Borough of Kensington and Chelsea, was grilled on his failure to hand over control of the aftermath of the fire, despite the borough’s lack of capacity. Peter Apps reports
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Week 75: ‘It still shocks me to the core that that’s how we treat our citizens in this country’
This week the inquiry heard witnesses from the housing management body discuss their role in the aftermath of the Grenfell Tower fire, followed by a range of witnesses from other organisations which supported the response. Peter Apps and Grainne Cuffe report
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Week 76: ‘I fear this will become our New Orleans’
This week the inquiry heard from central government figures and members of the London-wide emergency response arrangements. Peter Apps and Grainne Cuffe report
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Week 77: ‘The planning wasn’t done and there was nothing for us to be drawing on’
The Grenfell Tower Inquiry’s examination of the aftermath of the fire concluded with witnesses from central government. Peter Apps reports
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Module seven: expert evidence and closing statements
Week 78: ‘The abandonment of the ‘stay put’ strategy for high-rise residential buildings is essential’
This week the Grenfell Tower Inquiry heard a range of expert witnesses discuss their reports. Peter Apps and Grainne Cuffe report
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Week 79: ‘You could argue the system was created to enable people to circumvent the rules’
The Grenfell Tower Inquiry continued to hear expert evidence this week, with two senior figures in the world of fire safety academia criticising the government’s approach before and after the blaze. Peter Apps and Grainne Cuffe report
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Week 80: ‘The evidence points to wilful blindness and complacency towards safety’
As the inquiry moves into its final stages, lawyers for the key players gave statements about the evidence surrounding central government. Peter Apps reports
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Week 81: ‘This is Islamophobia. It’s racism. It is the elephant staring back at us in the room’
This week, closing statements covering the aftermath of the fire delivered a shocking new revelation and an expert toxicologist gave his views on the causes of the deaths. Peter Apps reports
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Module eight: further evidence relating to the deceased
Week 82: ‘Their chance to hear about the circumstances in which their loved ones died is the culmination of five years of waiting’
The Grenfell Tower Inquiry moved into its final module this week, with evidence relating to the circumstances in which the victims died. Peter Apps reports
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Week 83: ‘They died together as they lived: caring for one another’
A second week of evidence relating to the circumstances in which the victims of the fire died delivered more heartbreaking stories about their final moments. Peter Apps recaps
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Week 84: ‘Every decision affects someone who is an adored child, a beloved sister, a respected uncle, a needed mother’
The final week of oral evidence for the Grenfell Tower Inquiry’s second phase contained more heartbreaking evidence about the deaths in the tower. Peter Apps reports
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Closing statements
Week 85: ‘The merry-go-round turns still, the notes of its melody clearly audible in the last few days’
The Grenfell Tower Inquiry returned this week for closing statements from lawyers representing the bereaved and survivors and the various parties under scrutiny for the fire. Pete Apps reports.
