Rydon’s contract manager used “Essex boy patter” to push the use of cheaper cladding options for Grenfell Tower, the inquiry into the fire heard today.
The firm, which was revealed yesterday to have hidden the true size of potential savings on cladding to boost its own profit margin, wanted to use a cheaper “face-fixed” system rather than panels which had been cut into cassettes.
But planners at Kensington and Chelsea Council favoured the cassette system because they believed it gave a smoother and more aesthetically pleasing look.
“I have a gut feeling that [Kensington and Chelsea Tenant Management Organisation (KCTMO)] may go [for] the cassette fixed cladding option due to the perceived cladding risk,” wrote contract manager Simon Lawrence in an internal Rydon email. “I’m giving it my hardest sales pitch as we speak. Come on the Essex boy patter!”
In the event the planners had insisted on the cassette system despite the additional cost. This system is believed to have been far more dangerous in terms of fire performance as it exposed more of the combustible polyethylene core to the fire.
The exchange came in May 2014, when Rydon was seeking planning permission to switch the zinc cladding that had originally been specified to aluminium composite material (ACM) in order to save money.
In the emails Mr Lawrence had said he would “put forward our case that ACM is not an inferior product to zinc” to the planners.
Today he said that this referred only to “visual and aesthetics” rather than fire performance.
“The intention was we needed to make the case for everybody that ACM wasn’t a cheap, throwaway material in comparison to zinc,” he said.
Later in the day, he also denied giving an assurance that the cladding system was “inert” and “would not burn at all”.
Today the Grenfell Inquiry saw a witness statement from David Gibson, head of capital investment at KCTMO, which alleged he had specifically questioned Mr Lawrence about the fire risk from the cladding. He said he had been surprised to learn there would be a gap between the cladding panels and insulation, and was concerned this could create a chimney effect for flames.
“I raised this with [Mr] Lawrence as a matter of serious concern and asked him if he could give some assurance that we would not have a Lakanal-type problem,” his witness statement said – referring to the Lakanal House fire in 2009 which killed six people after spreading across combustible window panels.
“[Mr] Lawrence assured us that this would create no problems because the materials used were completely inert and would not burn at all. The meeting accepted his assurances in this regard.”
Mr Gibson said he had a “clear recollection” of the discussion from reading it in the meeting minutes. “I recall that ‘Lakanal’ had been spelled incorrectly in the minutes,” he said.
But when asked about this, Mr Lawrence said: “I don’t agree with it at all… I wouldn’t give technical assurances unless I had that information from designers or specialists.”
Mr Lawrence was also shown an email from Claire Williams, project manager at KCTMO, where she said she had a “Lacknall [sic] moment” and asked him for “clarification on the fire retardance of the cladding”.
Mr Lawrence did not reply and said today that he assumed she was referring to a small section of glass reinforced cladding on the lowest floor of the building rather than the whole system.
He was also asked to discuss a pitch from insulation manufacturer Rockwool in summer 2014 to replace the combustible insulation planned for Grenfell Tower with a non-combustible mineral wool alternative produced by the firm.
Rockwool said that this switch could secure additional environmental grants under the Energy Company Obligation funding programme.
The emails from Rockwool spelled out that its insulation had a “superior fire rating of Euroclass A1” which made it “particularly suited to high rise”. They proposed switching the ACM for their non-combustible Rockpanel system.
“You get a lot of approaches from manufacturers wanting to use their product on projects… but we didn’t know there was any difference between one or the other in terms of fire safety or anything else,” said Mr Lawrence.
In the end, Celotex RS5000 was used on the tower – an insulation made from the plastic polyisocyanurate, which is combustible and releases toxic gases when burned – despite a regulatory requirement that insulation on high rises be non-combustible or tested.
Mr Lawrence was also asked about the substitution of this insulation with Kingspan phenolic foam for some of the lower parts of the building.
He said he had no awareness that almost 150 sheets of this material arrived on site in May and September 2015, suggesting that the change may have come about due to financial difficulties being experienced by contractor Harley Facades.
“I think I might have an insight from now, since the disaster and since the evidence has come up. I think it’s relating to their credit limit and ceasing to trade one company and starting to trade with another,” Mr Lawrence said.
The Grenfell Tower Inquiry continues tomorrow with further evidence from Mr Lawrence.
Week one: A vivid picture of a broken industry
After a week of damning revelations at the opening of phase two of the Grenfell Tower Inquiry, Peter Apps recaps the key points
Week two: What is the significance of the immunity application?
Sir Martin Moore-Bick has written to the attorney general requesting protection for those set to give evidence at the Grenfell Tower Inquiry. Peter Apps explains what the move means
Week three: Architects of misfortune
This week saw the lead architects for the Grenfell Tower refurbishment give evidence to the inquiry. Peter Apps runs through the key points
Week four: ‘I didn’t have any perception that it was the monster it’s become’
The architects continued to give evidence this week, outlining a lack of understanding of the fire risk posed by the cladding materials and its design. Nathaniel Barker reports
Week five: ‘No adverse effect in relation to external fire spread’
As the Grenfell Tower Inquiry returns from its long absence, Peter Apps recaps the key points from a week of important evidence from the fire consultants to the refurbishment
Week six: ‘I can’t recall any instance where I discussed the materials with building control’
Nathaniel Barker summarises what we learned from fire engineers Exova, architects Studio E and the early evidence from contractor Rydon
Week seven: ‘I do not think I have ever worked with a contractor operating with this level of nonchalance’
Two key witnesses from contractor Rydon gave evidence this week. Peter Apps recaps some of the key points from a revealing week of evidence
Week eight: ‘It haunts me that it wasn't challenged’
Four witnesses from contractor Rydon gave evidence this week. Lucie Heath recaps what we learned on the last week of evidence before the inquiry breaks for five weeks
Week nine: ‘All I can say is you will be taken out for a very nice meal very soon’
This week the inquiry heard evidence from witnesses at Harley Facades, the sub-contractor responsible for Grenfell Tower’s cladding. Peter Apps recaps the key points
Week 10: ‘As we all know, ACM will be gone rather quickly in a fire!’
As the Grenfell Tower Inquiry entered its 10th week, Jack Simpson recaps the key points from a week of important evidence from the refurbishment’s cladding contractor
Week 11: ‘Did you get the impression Grenfell Tower was a guinea pig for this insulation?’
With witnesses from the cladding subcontractor, the firm which cut the deadly panels to shape and the clerk of works which inspected the job giving evidence this was week full of revelations. Peter Apps recaps the key points
Week 12: ‘Would you accept that was a serious failing on your part?’
With the surveyor who inspected Grenfell Tower for compliance giving evidence, this was a crucial week from the inquiry. Dominic Brady and Peter Apps report
Week 13: ‘Value for money is to be regarded as the key driver for this project’
With consultants to Kensington & Chelsea Tenant Management Organisation (KCTMO) giving evidence, attention at the Grenfell Tower Inquiry turned for this first time to the actions of the TMO and the council. Peter Apps reports
Week 14: ‘Did it not occur to you at this point that your budget was simply too low?’
This week, for the first time in phase two, the inquiry heard from Kensington & Chelsea Tenant Management Organisation, the landlord that oversaw the fatal refurbishment of Grenfell Tower. Lucie Heath reports
Week 15: ‘Have you ever informed the police that you destroyed documents relevant to their investigation?’
Witnesses from the Kensington and Chelsea Tenant Management Organisation (KCTMO) gave evidence for a second week, which began with a shocking revelation about withheld and destroyed evidence. Peter Apps recaps
Week 16: ‘I conclude this was very serious evidence of professional negligence’
This week saw members of Kensington & Chelsea Tenant Management Organisation finish giving evidence, before the inquiry’s expert witnesses took the stand to make some highly critical assessments of the work they had seen before and during the refurbishment of Grenfell Tower. Jack Simpson recaps
Grenfell Tower: a timeline of the refurbishment
Following the conclusion of module one of the Grenfell Inquiry’s second phase, Peter Apps presents a timeline of the key moments during the fatal refurbishment of the west London tower block
Week 17: ‘It’s hard to make a note about this because we are not clean’
The start of the second module of the Grenfell Tower Inquiry phase two came with some huge revelations about the companies that sold the products used in the cladding system. Peter Apps reports
Week 18: ‘It was just reckless optimism wasn't it?’
As the inquiry began cross-examining witnesses for the second module of its phase two work, the picture surrounding just how Grenfell Tower ended up wrapped in such dangerous materials became a little clearer. Nathaniel Barker was keeping an eye on proceedings
Week 19: ‘And that was intentional, deliberate, dishonest?’
The Grenfell Tower Inquiry this week heard the shocking story of how the insulation manufacturer “manipulated” official testing and marketed its product “dishonestly”. Peter Apps tells the story
Week 20: ‘We were outed by a consultant who we then had to fabricate a story to’
This week the inquiry investigated the actions of Kingspan – the manufacturer of one of the insulation products used in the tower’s cladding system. Dominic Brady reports
Week 21: ‘It’s there in black and white isn't it? We see a complete absence of any consideration of life safety’
The story of insulation giant Kingspan’s testing and marketing of its combustible insulation for high rises was unpacked in minute detail this week. Peter Apps reports
Week 22: ‘All we do is lie in here’
In the third week of evidence from insulation giant Kingspan, the inquiry continued to uncover shocking details about the firm’s behaviour both before and after the Grenfell Tower fire. Lucie Heath reports
Week 23: ‘That would have come as an earthquake to you at the time, would it not?’
This week the inquiry took its deepest dive yet into the inner workings of the cladding manufacturer whose product has been blamed for the terrible spread of fire up Grenfell Tower. Nathaniel Barker reports
Week 24: ‘Do you accept that Test 5B was Arconic's deadly secret’
The president of the firm that made and sold the cladding panels installed on Grenfell Tower was asked to account for the apparent concealment of “disastrous” fire tests on the product this week. Peter Apps reports
Week 25: ‘This is quite an incredible list of omissions and missed instances, isn’t it?’
This week the Grenfell Tower Inquiry heard its first witnesses from the Building Research Establishment (BRE) - the testing house which carried out key fire tests on the Kingspan and Celotex insulation products which were later used on Grenfell Tower. Peter Apps reports.
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