ao link
Twitter
Facebook
Linked In
Twitter
Facebook
Linked In

You are viewing 1 of your 1 free articles

Grenfell Inquiry day 80: fire doors in tower differed from those tested by manufacturer

Further evidence about poor-quality fire doors and failures of compartmentation was raised at today’s Grenfell Inquiry in central London.

Linked InTwitterFacebookeCard
Dr Barbara Lane gives evidence to the Grenfell Tower Inquiry
Dr Barbara Lane gives evidence to the Grenfell Tower Inquiry
Sharelines

Grenfell Inquiry day 80: fire doors differed from those tested #ukhousing

Dr Barbara Lane, who has produced a lengthy expert report for the inquiry and gave evidence last week, appeared before the inquiry again today to address further evidence points.

She began with a discussion of the fire doors in the tower – telling the inquiry that 106 of the 120 doors in the tower were replaced with a ‘Masterdor Suredor’ made by Manse Masterdor in a replacement programme that began in 2011.


READ MORE

Last risk assessment on Grenfell Tower warned fire doors were non-compliantLast risk assessment on Grenfell Tower warned fire doors were non-compliant
Moratorium on sale of composite fire doors liftedMoratorium on sale of composite fire doors lifted

These new fire doors have already been the subject of serious scrutiny, with many residents having also reported to the inquiry that their ‘self-closers’ were either missing or broken, meaning many were left open on the night of the blaze causing toxic smoke to pour into the lobbies and stairwells.

The police also revealed in March that they did not meet the legal minimum standard of 30 minutes’ fire resistance – despite having been tested to this standard before being sold.

Dr Lane told the inquiry today that the doors installed in Grenfell Tower differed from the product tested by the manufacturer before sale in several key ways.

She said the ‘hardware’ (such as locks and letter boxes) was different from the tested door.

“If you want to use the phrase ‘getting the door through the test’ it [the hardware] is a sensitive business. Any piece of metal, locks, letter boxes may act as heat spread route, flame spread route, hot smoke route and cause the door to fail,” she said.

She also said the door was tested on one side only, in contravention of guidance for composite doors. The glazing tested was also a different specification from that installed.

The doors were also never tested to the relevant ‘smoke’ standard – which requires cold smoke testing to check the doors for leakage. This standard is known as FD30S (Fire Door 30 minutes, smoke) as opposed to FD30, which does not have a smoke pass. “I don’t understand why an FD30 door was installed when an FD30S door should have been. S was not ordered and S was not delivered,” she said.

She added that guidance has been clear on the importance of self-closers since the 1970s, and that most best practice guidance suggests they should be checked for performance every six months.

“The guidance since the ’70s has been very clear about why it is so important,” she said.

Inside Housing analysis of survivors’ statements suggests self-closers were missing or broken in 56% of the flats in the tower.

Dr Lane also discussed the installation of gas pipes in the tower, which she said may have breached ‘compartmentation’ between the lobbies. This is the design feature which contains smoke within a certain space in the tower. The newly installed gas pipes in the lobbies were due to be ‘boxed-in’ but had not been by the time the fire happened.

She said she did not know if there was any interim fire-stopping material in place until this work was carried out, but added: “What it does affect is that [it] acts as a link from lobby to lobby. If the next pipe run if the same hole is there, it could act as a smoke run from lobby to lobby.”

She also explained that the lifts in Grenfell Tower did not have a ‘firefighting’ function, which requires an alternative power source and additional fire protection to allow their use during a blaze. She said this may have made the building non-compliant with a functional requirement of building regulations that all residents – including those with mobility issues – are able to escape.

Asked if the lift should have been taken out of service on the night of the fire, Dr Lane said: “Frankly, if I may say so, it shouldn’t have been provided in that condition in the first place and that should have been known.”

The inquiry continues.

The Grenfell Tower Inquiry

The Grenfell Tower Inquiry

Closing statements

 

Day 85: victims' lawyers attack the fire brigade

 

Further expert evidence

Including some additional evidence from emergency call handlers, bereaved and relatives

 

Day 84: further evidence from survivors and relatives

Day 83: swift evacuation of tower possible if residents alerted

Day 82: initial fire was extinguished but then returned to the flat

Day 81: overheating fridge-freezer most likely cause of fire

Day 80: fire doors installed did not match product tested

Day 79: resident advised to stay put despite fire in flat

Day 78: insulation and cladding material below required standard

Day 77: molten plastic spread blaze down tower

Day 76: 'stay put' should be dropped when fire spreads across floors

 

Other witness evidence

Police, ambulance, gas suppliers, council, TMO and call room operators give evidence

 

Day 75: call room operators give evidence

Day 74: further evidence from TMO officers

Day 73: TMO boss failed to pass information to firefighters

Day 72: fire finally extinguished when gas switched off

Day 71: further questions over stay put advice

Day 70: the police evidence

 

The bereaved, survivors and relatives’ evidence

 

Day 69: video shows smoke billowing through fire door

Day 68: KCTMO removed self closing mechanism and never replaced it

Day 67: gaps in cladding fixed with duct tape

Day 66: 'don't fix broken system with a sticking plaster'

Day 65: survivor dragged disabled man down nine floors to safety

Day 64: KCTMO 'did not replace broken fire door'

Day 63: foam insulation inside cladding 'exposed' says survivor

Day 62: father gives harrowing account of son's death

Day 61: council’s management organisation slammed for faulty electrics

Day 60: stay put advice ‘led to deaths’, residents say

Day 59: residents describe problems with new windows

Day 58: survivor describes how daughter saved his life

Day 57: firefighter evidence ‘a slap in the face’, says survivor

Day 56: relations with contractor were ‘toxic’

Day 55: resident 'never happy' with stay-put advice

Day 54: tenant gives evidence about housing association

Day 53: stay put advice 'felt like trap'

Day 52: resident saved by son's phone call

 

The firefighters’ evidence

 

Day 51: firefighter feared encouraging residents to jump

Day 50: the LFB commissioner

Day 49: fire chief reveals frustration over lack of building plans

Day 48: internal fire spread 'bigger story' than cladding

Day 47: fire officer considered evacuating crews over building collapse fears

Day 46: 'we were improvising' senior firefighter admits

Day 45: firefighter urged for abandonment of 'stay put' policy

Day 44: firefighter recalls radio signal difficulties

Day 43: call hander 'uncomfortable' with insisting residents stay put

Day 42: residents only told to leave if they called fire brigade back

Day 41: breathing equipment delay 'hampered rescues on upper floors'

Day 40: chiefs told firefighters to abandon policy

Day 39: firefighters reveal dramatic rescue of children

Day 38: firefighters issue aplogies to families

Day 37: council 'unable to provide tower plans'

Day 36: QC defends inquiry process

Day 35: Javid would welcome interim recommendations

Day 34: water from hose 'too weak' to reach the flames

Day 33: 'oh my god, we've been telling people to stay put'

Day 32: further fire fighter describes lack of equipment and low water pressure

Day 31: 'incredibly difficult' task of recording information outlined

Day 30: struggle to maintain control over rescue operation described

Day 29: fire service 'overwhelmed' by survival guidance calls

Day 28: 'the building beat us'

Day 27: firefighters 'forced to abandon plans to reach roof'

Day 26: poor signage hindered rescue efforts

Day 25: water pressure left firefighting equipment 'like garden hose'

Day 24: decision to abandon 'stay put' explored

Day 23: TV images 'could have assissted' rescue effort

Day 22: description of hectic scenes in the control centre

Day 21: account from the fire service 'nerve centre'

Day 20: firefighter describes 'huge volume' of calls from trapped residents

Day 19: firefighter 'given no training on cladding fires'

Day 18: evacuation would have been 'huge catastrophe'

Day 17: firefighters describe access and lift issues

Day 16: scenes of carnage likened to 9/11

Day 15: firefighters recount trauma of survival guidance calls

Day 14: firefighters describe spread of blaze

Day 13: firefighters recall radio difficulties

Day 12: "it was like a war zone"

Day 11: questions raised over fire fighters' radios

Day 10: watch manager emotional under questioning

Day nine: lead firefighter 'not trained in stay put policy'

 

The expert reports: authors give evidence to inquiry

 

Day eight: where the fire started

Day seven: what was in the cladding?

Day six: the cause and spread of the fire

Day five: expert highlights key issues

Day four: firefighters defend response to fire

Day three: council and contractors appear for the first time

Day two: lawyers for the survivors make their case

Day one: expert evidence released on cladding and stay put

 

The commemoration hearings

 

30 May: Grenfell Council 'recognised it should not house disabled victim above four storeys'

29 May: Anger on day six of the Grenfell Inquiry

25 May: Grenfell families 'forced to live in chimney with stay put policy'

24 May: Grenfell family complained about father being housed on 17th floor

23 May: Tributes to children on third day of Grenfell hearings

22 May: Emotions run high as Grenfell bereaved shown footage of the tower burning

21 May: Grenfell victims share tributes as inquiry opens

 

Linked InTwitterFacebookeCard
Add New Comment
You must be logged in to comment.
By continuing to browse this site you are agreeing to the use of cookies. Browsing is anonymised until you sign up. Click for more info.
Cookie Settings