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Grenfell Inquiry day 62: father gives harrowing evidence of son’s death

A father who lost his five-year-old son as the family tried to escape from the 18th floor has given harrowing evidence of the night to the Grenfell Tower inquiry.   

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Grenfell Inquiry day 62: father gives harrowing evidence of son’s death #ukhousing

A witness statement released by Paulos Tekle, who appeared before the inquiry in central London yesterday, sets out the details of his attempt to flee the 18th floor at close to 3am.

He describes how he and his partner had spent the evening before the blaze taking their son Isaac to Taekwondo and extra maths classes.

Mr Tekle, a minicab driver, had planned to work that evening, but instead slept beside Isaac to help him go to sleep.

After waking up at 1.30am and discovering the fire he made a series of calls to the emergency services and was advised to stay put.

“I trusted the authorities and I believed they were coming to rescue us,” Mr Tekle said in his witness statement. “Otherwise I would have taken the children and we would have left.”


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As Mr Tekle has previously described in a moving tribute to his son at an earlier stage of the inquiry, firefighters attended his flat at 2am and advised him to continue to wait for rescue.

In his statement released today, Mr Tekle directly challenged the evidence given by a firefighter who had said that Mr Tekle said he was safe and did not wish to speak to him before shutting the door. He said this evidence was “distressing to read”.

Mr Tekle described his fear that smoke and flame would overwhelm the flat and his family would suffer “a horrible and painful death”. He took his son and prepared to jump out of the window of the 18th floor, back first, in the hope that his body would protect his son from the impact of the fall. His partner persuaded him not to.

He was eventually called by the fire service at 2.54am and told to get out of the tower. By this point another family from the floor were also sheltering in the same flat, and there were currently five children in the home.

The family tied wet bedsheets around their heads and fled – with Mr Tekle taking his younger son and a neighbour carrying Isaac. He claimed a firefighter on the landing at this point “did not help” with the bedsheets or the children, or give any advice on how to escape safely.

Mr Tekle stumbled and fell as he descended, and said he believes he was unconscious for a time. He eventually met firefighters on the lower floors and was helped to safety.

However, outside he met the neighbour who had been carrying Isaac, who told him that his son had been lost inside the tower. He said at this stage his partner was very distraught, “crawling on the ground, crying and wailing that she had to find our son”.

The family were taken to hospital, but both parents quickly discharged themselves to return and hunt for their son.

Days later – with no official confirmation given to the family – his death was reported by BBC News. Isaac’s death was not confirmed by the authorities to his parents until 11 days after the blaze.

His post-mortem showed severe injuries to his feet and ankles, which Mr Tekle said “cannot... have been caused just by the fire”.

In a further witness statement released by the inquiry today Rabia Yahya, who lived on the same floor, gave an account of her escape from the fire with her family and her children.

Discussing the installation of new fire doors by Kensington and Chelsea Tenant Management Organisation (KCTMO) she said: “Unfortunately the new door soon broke. It came off its hinges and jammed so we couldn’t close it. We reported this to the TMO and to a woman from Rydon, but no one ever came to fix it. Instead, [my husband] had to take out the pole from the centre of the door which makes it a fire door. This enabled us to close it, but after that the door didn’t close automatically. He took out the pole by unscrewing it with his hands. The screws were already loose.”

The family of five – including Ms Yahya who was heavily pregnant – were initially offered a one-bedroom room on the 22nd floor of a hotel after the fire, which they refused, and were eventually housed on a lower floor.

After Ms Yahya gave birth in November last year, the hotel refused to allow the newborn to stay and the family was finally offered temporary accommodation.

The Grenfell Tower Inquiry

The Grenfell Tower Inquiry

Closing statements

 

Day 85: victims' lawyers attack the fire brigade

 

Further expert evidence

Including some additional evidence from emergency call handlers, bereaved and relatives

 

Day 84: further evidence from survivors and relatives

Day 83: swift evacuation of tower possible if residents alerted

Day 82: initial fire was extinguished but then returned to the flat

Day 81: overheating fridge-freezer most likely cause of fire

Day 80: fire doors installed did not match product tested

Day 79: resident advised to stay put despite fire in flat

Day 78: insulation and cladding material below required standard

Day 77: molten plastic spread blaze down tower

Day 76: 'stay put' should be dropped when fire spreads across floors

 

Other witness evidence

Police, ambulance, gas suppliers, council, TMO and call room operators give evidence

 

Day 75: call room operators give evidence

Day 74: further evidence from TMO officers

Day 73: TMO boss failed to pass information to firefighters

Day 72: fire finally extinguished when gas switched off

Day 71: further questions over stay put advice

Day 70: the police evidence

 

The bereaved, survivors and relatives’ evidence

 

Day 69: video shows smoke billowing through fire door

Day 68: KCTMO removed self closing mechanism and never replaced it

Day 67: gaps in cladding fixed with duct tape

Day 66: 'don't fix broken system with a sticking plaster'

Day 65: survivor dragged disabled man down nine floors to safety

Day 64: KCTMO 'did not replace broken fire door'

Day 63: foam insulation inside cladding 'exposed' says survivor

Day 62: father gives harrowing account of son's death

Day 61: council’s management organisation slammed for faulty electrics

Day 60: stay put advice ‘led to deaths’, residents say

Day 59: residents describe problems with new windows

Day 58: survivor describes how daughter saved his life

Day 57: firefighter evidence ‘a slap in the face’, says survivor

Day 56: relations with contractor were ‘toxic’

Day 55: resident 'never happy' with stay-put advice

Day 54: tenant gives evidence about housing association

Day 53: stay put advice 'felt like trap'

Day 52: resident saved by son's phone call

 

The firefighters’ evidence

 

Day 51: firefighter feared encouraging residents to jump

Day 50: the LFB commissioner

Day 49: fire chief reveals frustration over lack of building plans

Day 48: internal fire spread 'bigger story' than cladding

Day 47: fire officer considered evacuating crews over building collapse fears

Day 46: 'we were improvising' senior firefighter admits

Day 45: firefighter urged for abandonment of 'stay put' policy

Day 44: firefighter recalls radio signal difficulties

Day 43: call hander 'uncomfortable' with insisting residents stay put

Day 42: residents only told to leave if they called fire brigade back

Day 41: breathing equipment delay 'hampered rescues on upper floors'

Day 40: chiefs told firefighters to abandon policy

Day 39: firefighters reveal dramatic rescue of children

Day 38: firefighters issue aplogies to families

Day 37: council 'unable to provide tower plans'

Day 36: QC defends inquiry process

Day 35: Javid would welcome interim recommendations

Day 34: water from hose 'too weak' to reach the flames

Day 33: 'oh my god, we've been telling people to stay put'

Day 32: further fire fighter describes lack of equipment and low water pressure

Day 31: 'incredibly difficult' task of recording information outlined

Day 30: struggle to maintain control over rescue operation described

Day 29: fire service 'overwhelmed' by survival guidance calls

Day 28: 'the building beat us'

Day 27: firefighters 'forced to abandon plans to reach roof'

Day 26: poor signage hindered rescue efforts

Day 25: water pressure left firefighting equipment 'like garden hose'

Day 24: decision to abandon 'stay put' explored

Day 23: TV images 'could have assissted' rescue effort

Day 22: description of hectic scenes in the control centre

Day 21: account from the fire service 'nerve centre'

Day 20: firefighter describes 'huge volume' of calls from trapped residents

Day 19: firefighter 'given no training on cladding fires'

Day 18: evacuation would have been 'huge catastrophe'

Day 17: firefighters describe access and lift issues

Day 16: scenes of carnage likened to 9/11

Day 15: firefighters recount trauma of survival guidance calls

Day 14: firefighters describe spread of blaze

Day 13: firefighters recall radio difficulties

Day 12: "it was like a war zone"

Day 11: questions raised over fire fighters' radios

Day 10: watch manager emotional under questioning

Day nine: lead firefighter 'not trained in stay put policy'

 

The expert reports: authors give evidence to inquiry

 

Day eight: where the fire started

Day seven: what was in the cladding?

Day six: the cause and spread of the fire

Day five: expert highlights key issues

Day four: firefighters defend response to fire

Day three: council and contractors appear for the first time

Day two: lawyers for the survivors make their case

Day one: expert evidence released on cladding and stay put

 

The commemoration hearings

 

30 May: Grenfell Council 'recognised it should not house disabled victim above four storeys'

29 May: Anger on day six of the Grenfell Inquiry

25 May: Grenfell families 'forced to live in chimney with stay put policy'

24 May: Grenfell family complained about father being housed on 17th floor

23 May: Tributes to children on third day of Grenfell hearings

22 May: Emotions run high as Grenfell bereaved shown footage of the tower burning

21 May: Grenfell victims share tributes as inquiry opens

 

Never Again campaign

Never Again campaign

In the days following the Grenfell Tower fire on 14 June 2017, Inside Housing launched the Never Again campaign to call for immediate action to implement the learning from the Lakanal House fire, and a commitment to act – without delay – on learning from the Grenfell Tower tragedy as it becomes available.

One year on, we have extended the campaign asks in the light of information that has emerged since.

Here are our updated asks:

GOVERNMENT

  • Act on the recommendations from Dame Judith Hackitt’s review of building regulations to tower blocks of 18m and higher. Commit to producing a timetable for implementation by autumn 2018, setting out how recommendations that don’t require legislative change can be taken forward without delay
  • Follow through on commitments to fully ban combustible materials on high-rise buildings
  • Unequivocally ban desktop studies
  • Review recommendations and advice given to ministers after the Lakanal House fire and implement necessary changes
  • Publish details of all tower blocks with dangerous cladding, insulation and/or external panels and commit to a timeline for remedial works. Provide necessary guidance to landlords to ensure that removal work can begin on all affected private and social residential blocks by the end of 2018. Complete quarterly follow-up checks to ensure that remedial work is completed to the required standard. Checks should not cease until all work is completed.
  • Stand by the prime minister’s commitment to fully fund the removal of dangerous cladding
  • Fund the retrofitting of sprinkler systems in all tower blocks across the UK (except where there are specific structural reasons not to do so)
  • Explore options for requiring remedial works on affected private sector residential tower blocks

LOCAL GOVERNMENT

  • Take immediate action to identify privately owned residential tower blocks so that cladding and external panels can be checked

LANDLORDS

  • Publish details of the combinations of insulations and cladding materials for all high rise blocks
  • Commit to ensuring that removal work begins on all blocks with dangerous materials by the end of 2018 upon receipt of guidance from government
  • Publish current fire risk assessments for all high rise blocks (the Information Commissioner has required councils to publish and recommended that housing associations should do the same). Work with peers to share learning from assessments and improve and clarify the risk assessment model.
  • Commit to renewing assessments annually and after major repair or cladding work is carried out. Ensure assessments consider the external features of blocks. Always use an appropriate, qualified expert to conduct assessments.
  • Review and update evacuation policies and ‘stay put’ advice in the light of risk assessments, and communicate clearly to residents
  • Adopt Dame Judith Hackitt’s recommended approach for listening to and addressing tenants’ concerns, with immediate effect

CURRENT SIGNATORIES:

  • Chartered Institute of Housing
  • G15
  • National Federation of ALMOs
  • National Housing Federation
  • Placeshapers

 

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