Grenfell cladding contractor ‘took it on trust’ that products complied
The cladding sub-contractor for Grenfell Tower was “confused” by basic fire standards for cladding products and “took it on trust” from the manufacturers that they were compliant, the inquiry into the fire heard today.
Ray Bailey, the founder and managing director of Harley Facades, was grilled today on the selection of combustible Celotex RS5000 insulation and deadly Reynobond PE 55 aluminium composite material (ACM) cladding for the walls of Grenfell.
In other evidence today, it was revealed:
- A design drawing annotated with “weak link for fire” was not raised with architects or building control officers by Harley
- Mr Bailey appointed his 25-year-old son Ben Bailey as project manager, despite the fact that he had just one job’s prior experience
- An internal Harley email shortly before being appointed warned that “we are doomed to fail” without additional resource
At the time of the project, rules required insulation to be of limited combustibility – which Celotex was not – or in a system justified by a large-scale test.
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But Mr Bailey today said he erroneously believed that a statement in Celotex’s marketing material saying that the product was ‘Class 0 throughout’ meant it met the limited combustibility standard.
“I think this was always described as Class 0 throughout. This was a confusion of mine and also throughout the industry,” he said.
He added that he believed the product could be used with ACM, despite having been tested with far less combustible cement fibre cladding panels. He said he based this assumption on conversations with Celotex.
“They [Celotex] said it was safe and acceptable to use it in the configuration we had. If they had told us it wasn’t, it wouldn’t be on the building,” said Mr Bailey.
“Did anybody at Harley undertake any independent verification or did you just take it on trust from Celotex?” asked Richard Millett, counsel to the inquiry.
“Celotex are a major insulation manufacturer… we do not expect to be misled by them, so yes, we trusted what they told us,” said Mr Bailey.
“Even though they had a vested interest in making sure you bought the product because they were making it and selling it?” asked Mr Millett.
“Yes. How… why would they lie to us?” replied Mr Bailey.
Celotex is yet to give evidence, but has denied that it had any design responsibility in its opening statement. Shown email correspondence with the firm in the afternoon, Mr Bailey conceded that the emails did not amount to confirmation that the product was safe for Grenfell.
Regarding the ACM, Mr Bailey was grilled in detail about his understanding of a certificate from the British Board of Agrement (BBA) that appeared to show the product had a Class 0 rating.
Unlike the insulation, this would have made it compliant with the basic standards in government guidance.
But Mr Bailey was unable to explain why he had not noted disclaimers in the certificate surrounding issues such as changes of colour, or that the Class 0 rating it afforded the panels apparently related to the “surface” only.
He said he had reviewed the certificate in 2008 when it was first issued and was then content to use ACM in Harley projects on high-rise buildings.
He said he was “absolutely not” made aware of tests in France that had shown the product had a rock-bottom fire rating of Class E when cut into cassette form.
Later in the day, the inquiry was shown a drawing of the top of the windows that had been annotated “weak link for fire” by cavity barrier provider Siderise.
Asked about this, Mr Bailey said he believed that Chris Mort, who made the note, had “got the wrong end of the stick”, but admitted that he did not raise it with building control and conceded “that would have been the better thing to do”.
He earlier explained that missing cavity barriers at the top of windows, in breach of official guidance, were left out because of a general belief in the industry that they were not necessary.
“This comes back to the industry practice that if you have got a single window in a compartment it’s not always regarded as necessary,” he said. “I accept according to Approved Document B [government guidance] that is an incorrect assumption.”
This was despite that fact that Harley’s own report into a fire at another block with ACM cladding identified that “the Harley-designed fire break system” prevented fire from spreading between flats.
He was also grilled about the appointment of his son, Ben Bailey, in February 2015 as project manager. Ben had previously project-managed only one job – Merit House in Barnet. Inside Housing revealed in June that this building is among 14 other Harley projects that have required urgent remediation since the fire.
Mr Bailey said his son had worked for the company “during school and university holidays since 2009, so he’s very familiar with project management”.
The inquiry also saw an internal Harley email shortly before its appointment in 2014 which warned that items would “need looking at by our proposed Grenfell House [sic] construction team”.
“And therein lies the problem,” the email said. “We don’t fucking have one.”
It added: “Unless we can gear up and service it we are doomed to fail.”
Mr Bailey said that an additional designer was appointed following this email, which meant Harley could cope with the work.
Asked at the end of his evidence what he would do differently, an emotional Mr Bailey said: “There is no one in the construction team working on Grenfell or on the hundreds of other buildings across the UK, who would have thought for one minute that anything we were doing would be unsafe. But if I could go back in time armed with what I know now – certification, testing regimes, caveats, the misinterpretation of building regulations…
“This stuff – Reynobond, Celotex, Kingspan – none of it would be on the wall. The legislation is complicated to use, it’s not very clear. I think any form of combustible insulation or cladding should be banned immediately. That’s not my place to say but if building regs banned it, it wouldn’t be on the buildings.”
The inquiry continues tomorrow with another Harley witness, Mark Harris.
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Grenfell Tower Inquiry phase two: weekly diaries
Module one
Week one: A vivid picture of a broken industry
After a week of damning revelations at the opening of phase two of the Grenfell Tower Inquiry, Peter Apps recaps the key points
Click here to read the full story
Week two: What is the significance of the immunity application?
Sir Martin Moore-Bick has written to the attorney general requesting protection for those set to give evidence at the Grenfell Tower Inquiry. Peter Apps explains what the move means
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Week three: Architects of misfortune
This week saw the lead architects for the Grenfell Tower refurbishment give evidence to the inquiry. Peter Apps runs through the key points
Click here to read the full story
Week four: ‘I didn’t have any perception that it was the monster it’s become’
The architects continued to give evidence this week, outlining a lack of understanding of the fire risk posed by the cladding materials and its design. Nathaniel Barker reports
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Week five: ‘No adverse effect in relation to external fire spread’
As the Grenfell Tower Inquiry returns from its long absence, Peter Apps recaps the key points from a week of important evidence from the fire consultants to the refurbishment
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Week six: ‘I can’t recall any instance where I discussed the materials with building control’
Nathaniel Barker summarises what we learned from fire engineers Exova, architects Studio E and the early evidence from contractor Rydon
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Week seven: ‘I do not think I have ever worked with a contractor operating with this level of nonchalance’
Two key witnesses from contractor Rydon gave evidence this week. Peter Apps recaps some of the key points from a revealing week of evidence
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Week eight: ‘It haunts me that it wasn't challenged’
Four witnesses from contractor Rydon gave evidence this week. Lucie Heath recaps what we learned on the last week of evidence before the inquiry breaks for five weeks
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Week nine: ‘All I can say is you will be taken out for a very nice meal very soon’
This week the inquiry heard evidence from witnesses at Harley Facades, the sub-contractor responsible for Grenfell Tower’s cladding. Peter Apps recaps the key points
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Week 10: ‘As we all know, ACM will be gone rather quickly in a fire!’
As the Grenfell Tower Inquiry entered its 10th week, Jack Simpson recaps the key points from a week of important evidence from the refurbishment’s cladding contractor
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Week 11: ‘Did you get the impression Grenfell Tower was a guinea pig for this insulation?’
With witnesses from the cladding subcontractor, the firm which cut the deadly panels to shape and the clerk of works which inspected the job giving evidence this was week full of revelations. Peter Apps recaps the key points
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Week 12: ‘Would you accept that was a serious failing on your part?’
With the surveyor who inspected Grenfell Tower for compliance giving evidence, this was a crucial week from the inquiry. Dominic Brady and Peter Apps report
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Week 13: ‘Value for money is to be regarded as the key driver for this project’
With consultants to Kensington & Chelsea Tenant Management Organisation (KCTMO) giving evidence, attention at the Grenfell Tower Inquiry turned for this first time to the actions of the TMO and the council. Peter Apps reports
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Week 14: ‘Did it not occur to you at this point that your budget was simply too low?’
This week, for the first time in phase two, the inquiry heard from Kensington & Chelsea Tenant Management Organisation, the landlord that oversaw the fatal refurbishment of Grenfell Tower. Lucie Heath reports
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Week 15: ‘Have you ever informed the police that you destroyed documents relevant to their investigation?’
Witnesses from the Kensington and Chelsea Tenant Management Organisation (KCTMO) gave evidence for a second week, which began with a shocking revelation about withheld and destroyed evidence. Peter Apps recaps
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Week 16: ‘I conclude this was very serious evidence of professional negligence’
This week saw members of Kensington & Chelsea Tenant Management Organisation finish giving evidence, before the inquiry’s expert witnesses took the stand to make some highly critical assessments of the work they had seen before and during the refurbishment of Grenfell Tower. Jack Simpson recaps
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Grenfell Tower: a timeline of the refurbishment
Following the conclusion of module one of the Grenfell Inquiry’s second phase, Peter Apps presents a timeline of the key moments during the fatal refurbishment of the west London tower block
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Module two
Week 17: ‘It’s hard to make a note about this because we are not clean’
The start of the second module of the Grenfell Tower Inquiry phase two came with some huge revelations about the companies that sold the products used in the cladding system. Peter Apps reports
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Week 18: ‘It was just reckless optimism wasn't it?’
As the inquiry began cross-examining witnesses for the second module of its phase two work, the picture surrounding just how Grenfell Tower ended up wrapped in such dangerous materials became a little clearer. Nathaniel Barker was keeping an eye on proceedings
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Week 19: ‘And that was intentional, deliberate, dishonest?’
The Grenfell Tower Inquiry this week heard the shocking story of how the insulation manufacturer “manipulated” official testing and marketed its product “dishonestly”. Peter Apps tells the story
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Week 20: ‘We were outed by a consultant who we then had to fabricate a story to’
This week the inquiry investigated the actions of Kingspan – the manufacturer of one of the insulation products used in the tower’s cladding system. Dominic Brady reports
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Week 21: ‘It’s there in black and white isn't it? We see a complete absence of any consideration of life safety’
The story of insulation giant Kingspan’s testing and marketing of its combustible insulation for high rises was unpacked in minute detail this week. Peter Apps reports
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Week 22: ‘All we do is lie in here’
In the third week of evidence from insulation giant Kingspan, the inquiry continued to uncover shocking details about the firm’s behaviour both before and after the Grenfell Tower fire. Lucie Heath reports
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Week 23: ‘That would have come as an earthquake to you at the time, would it not?’
This week the inquiry took its deepest dive yet into the inner workings of the cladding manufacturer whose product has been blamed for the terrible spread of fire up Grenfell Tower. Nathaniel Barker reports
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Week 24: ‘Do you accept that Test 5B was Arconic's deadly secret’
The president of the firm that made and sold the cladding panels installed on Grenfell Tower was asked to account for the apparent concealment of “disastrous” fire tests on the product this week. Peter Apps reports
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Week 25: ‘This is quite an incredible list of omissions and missed instances, isn’t it?’
This week the Grenfell Tower Inquiry heard its first witnesses from the Building Research Establishment (BRE) - the testing house which carried out key fire tests on the Kingspan and Celotex insulation products which were later used on Grenfell Tower. Peter Apps reports.
