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Grenfell Tower Inquiry diary week 23: ‘That would have come as an earthquake to you at the time, would it not?’

This week the inquiry took its deepest dive yet into the inner workings of the cladding manufacturer whose product has been blamed for the terrible spread of fire up Grenfell Tower. Nathaniel Barker reports

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This week the inquiry took its deepest dive yet into the inner workings of the cladding manufacturer whose product has been blamed for the terrible spread of fire up Grenfell Tower. @NatBarkerIH reports #UKhousing

The Grenfell Tower Inquiry returned this week for the first time since early December, having been again delayed by the COVID-19 pandemic. Hearings took place over video call, a temporary measure that the inquiry has promised will stay in place only for “as long as is absolutely necessary”.

We heard more evidence from insulation giant Kingspan – about which shocking revelations had emerged before Christmas regarding its marketing and testing practices.

And for the first time, witnesses from Arconic, the multinational firm that manufactured the cladding panels used on Grenfell Tower, were subject to questioning. Remember, this cladding was identified as the “primary cause” of fire spread up the building in the inquiry’s phase one report.

The timing was fitting. As housing secretary Robert Jenrick was in parliament laying out the government’s grand plan to fix the gargantuan cladding scandal rocking the nation, the Grenfell Tower Inquiry was uncovering how it all started in forensic detail.


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Absentees ‘unreasonable’

Absentees ‘unreasonable’

Before the first Arconic witness was called, Richard Millett QC (above), lead counsel to the inquiry, delivered a lengthy statement. He confirmed that three of the company’s former employees – Claude Wehrle, Gwenaelle Derrendinger and Peter Froehlich – are still refusing to give oral evidence.

The trio are arguing that the so-called French Blocking Statute means they could be prosecuted for doing so. That is despite France’s embassy in London confirming that this is not the case, and despite their former colleague Claude Schmidt now agreeing to attend.

“The inquiry’s position is that the refusal of these witnesses to come and give evidence is unreasonable,” Mr Millett said.

He also revealed that Arconic refused to disclose documents to the inquiry – and did so only after the Metropolitan Police requested a European Investigation Order.

The inquiry will ‘empty chair’ absent Arconic witnesses, presenting evidence it wanted to ask them about.

‘That would have come as an earthquake to you at the time, would it not?’

‘That would have come as an earthquake to you at the time, would it not?’

The bulk of this week’s substantive evidence came from Deborah French (above), the former UK sales manager at Arconic who sold the cladding used on Grenfell Tower. She was under cross-examination for a little over two days – but for Ms French, it probably felt like much longer.

Grenfell United tweeted that on her second day of evidence alone she said either “I don’t remember” or “I don’t recall” more than 250 times. There were uncomfortable moments aplenty.

One particular moment occurred late on Wednesday. Ms French was shown an email sent by Mr Wehrle, then technical manager at Arconic, to several colleagues, including her, in February 2014.

Attached to this email was a recent test report for Reynobond PE – the product Ms French had been selling for years and was currently discussing with Grenfell refurbishment sub-contractors.

It showed that the polyethylene-cored panels achieved a fire safety rating of only Euroclass E, the second-lowest possible. This was significant because until that point, Arconic had been using a 2008 test report to claim that the product met the much higher Euroclass B standard, which was the basis on which the British Board of Agrément (BBA) had issued a certificate stating that Reynobond PE “may be regarded” as meeting UK national Class 0.

This Class 0 certification effectively cleared the product for use on high rises such as Grenfell Tower under English building guidance and was frequently sent to buyers by Ms French.

In his email, Mr Wehrle wrote: “The previous ‘B’ class reported done for Reynobond PE in riveted system can no more be used from now.”

But here’s the thing: it appears Ms French did nothing about this email from Mr Wehrle. She did not update her customers as other Arconic salespeople in Europe had done – and in fact sent the now-obsolete BBA certificate to the Grenfell sub-contractors just two months later.

Mr Millett then memorably told Ms French that “not a single person” who had given evidence to the inquiry before her – including architects, contractors, cladding designers, and building control officers – knew that Reynobond was ever identified as Class E. She agreed with him that she was in a position to make this known, and that she should have done so, but insisted: “I wouldn’t have deliberately withheld it for any reason.”

Ms French’s inaction following this email contrasted sharply with the proactive approach she apparently took in May 2013 following a major fire in Dubai involving aluminium composite material cladding similar to Reynobond PE.

Then, she contacted her customers to tell them that “on all projects” Arconic was able “to offer the right Reynobond specification including the core” (in reference to the fact that the company also sold a fire-retardant (FR) version of the product).

This week Ms French backtracked on this email and said “it was too heavy on the sales side”. But later, under pressure from Mr Millett, she agreed that in the case of Grenfell she had been in a position to ensure that the Reynobond product with the appropriate core ended up on the tower. But she did not.

Debbie French 2

Things went from bad to worse for Ms French on Thursday morning. It emerged that in 2015, shortly after leaving Arconic for a new job in the industry and while Reynobond PE was being ferried to Grenfell Tower, she realised that the product did not have a test report confirming it met Class 0 standards.

Mr Millett put it to her that this news – which meant she had for years been selling a product for use on high-rise buildings under false claims about its safety – “would have come as an earthquake”.

“I cannot remember what my reaction was to that other than, you know, surprised at the time that it didn’t have the Class 0,” Ms French said.

But, Mr Millett demanded, surely if she had been truly shocked and surprised she would be able to remember her reaction? Was it not the case that in fact she was not surprised at all because she already knew that Reynobond PE had no Class 0-supporting test report?

“I’m not sure,” Ms French replied. She did, however, deny having been aware that Reynobond PE did not have a test report supporting it for use as Class 0 for “a long time”.

In any case, she did not take steps to tell Vince Meakins, her replacement at Arconic, about this realisation – or anyone else.

To Mr Millett’s visible exasperation, she claimed that it did not occur to her at this point that she had sold Reynobond PE for use on Grenfell on a false basis regarding its fire classification, saying: “I didn’t have the knowledge to put all those facts together.”

That answer spoke to a theme common throughout the inquiry so far, but particularly noticeable during Ms French’s evidence.

Repeatedly, she declared an acute lack of knowledge about the products and documents she was handling on a daily basis, and asserted that she trusted others in the Arconic hierarchy to be making the right decisions. “Working for an organisation like [Arconic] it didn’t even enter my head that it was or it wasn’t suitable,” she said of Reynobond PE early on. These claims were challenged on many occasions by Mr Millett.

As usual, at the end of her cross-examination, Ms French was asked if there was anything she would have done differently during her involvement in the Grenfell Tower refurbishment.

This is how she responded: “I’ve obviously had a good few years to be able to reflect on this. I mean, firstly, I want to say that it was a dreadful tragedy. One that I hope that we never have to witness again. I’ve learned significant amounts, and there is an awful lot that I’ve learned and taken on board fully. And I’m making sure that I improve on that knowledge every day. And that I pass that on to everybody that I’m currently working with and come into contact with.”

‘They are very secret over stuff like that’

‘They are very secret over stuff like that’

The inquiry is clearly frustrated that it has been able to call only a limited number of witnesses from Arconic to give evidence. And no wonder – there are some enormous questions surrounding the firm that still need to be answered.

For one: why did it not inform the BBA that the Class 0 certificate for Reynobond PE needed to be withdrawn after it internally dropped the associated Euroclass B certificate? In fact, why did it continue to sell Reynobond PE at all when it was well aware that it was dangerous, and competitors were taking similar products off the market?

On Thursday the inquiry was shown the transcript of a phone conversation between Ms French and one of her former Arconic clients that took place in the immediate aftermath of the Grenfell Tower fire. It revealed that Ms French told the client that Arconic chose “not to put it in the public domain” that it had internally withdrawn the Euroclass B report, adding that “they are very secret over stuff like that”.

Further, she said that “cost implications” had been behind the decision not to remove Reynobond PE from the market. The inquiry earlier heard that Arconic made a profit margin of around €7-8 on Reynobond PE, compared with €5-6 for the fire-resistant version.

(As a rather depressing aside, the inquiry heard this week that using Reynobond FR on Grenfell Tower would have likely cost about €28,000 to €30,000 more than the PE core that was used – just 0.3% of the refurbishment budget.)

Monday will see the return of Ms French’s replacement at Arconic, Mr Meakins. His evidence on Thursday established that he was pushed, unlike Ms French, to sell the fire-resistant version of Reynobond. He was also unaware that there was no valid Class 0 test certificate for Reynobond PE.

Expect the inquiry to delve further into the decisions Arconic was making about its products in the run-up to the Grenfell Tower fire.

‘FANBLOODYTASTIC’

‘FANBLOODYTASTIC’

By Peter Apps

Before Ms French took the stand (or Zoom call, at least), there was one witness from insulation manufacturer Kingspan for the inquiry to cross-examine.

Andrew Pack (above) was asked about two primary matters: his role as leader of the technical advice team in the 2000s and the work he did in relation to obtaining a certificate from the Local Authority Building Control (LABC), which proved important in persuading the industry that Kingspan’s insulation was suitable for use on high rises.

On both, Mr Pack sought to minimise his involvement, claiming that his was largely an “admin” role and that questions about K15 (the combustible insulation that formed part of Grenfell Tower’s cladding system) were a minor part of his overall job.

But there were plenty of difficult questions to answer. His job was to lead the team that answered queries from architects and consultants about the appropriate use of Kingspan products. While he claimed that most queries relating to the use of K15 on high rises were passed to another, more specialist team, this was not always the case.

Why, for example, did he email a client in September 2011 suggesting that the product had passed a test clearing it for use on steel-frame buildings?

He claimed his understanding was that its solitary test pass (which related to masonry construction) was acceptable so long as the steel frame had a non-combustible board attached. But this is not what his email said.

“In plain and simple terms what you have written here, that tests in plural have been carried out, and include tests to BS 8414 part 2 [the test for steel frame, which Kingspan had not passed] is not true, is it?” counsel Rachel Troup asked.

“Correct,” Mr Pack replied.

With regard to the LABC certificate, Mr Pack arranged the initial meetings with LABC and checked a draft of the document. At no point did he query or correct a critical error: the statement that K15 could be considered a product of limited combustibility (the standard required for use on high rises, which it did not meet).

His argument was that he felt the certificate merely cleared the product for use behind non-combustible cladding (which, incidentally, even itself would have been more than was actually permitted by the rules).

But he found it tougher to explain the jubilation of his boss, Philip Heath, about the certificate’s wording, with the inquiry revealing emails that showed him describing it as “GOLD” and “FANBLOODYTASTIC”.

Mr Pack said that Mr Heath would have to explain his excitement himself. Sadly, Mr Heath has already been questioned and the inquiry did not have these emails at that time.

Grenfell Tower Inquiry: week 23 headlines

Grenfell Tower Inquiry: week 23 headlines

Grenfell Tower Inquiry phase two: weekly diaries

Grenfell Tower Inquiry phase two: weekly diaries

Module one: the refurbishment

Week one: A vivid picture of a broken industry

After a week of damning revelations at the opening of phase two of the Grenfell Tower Inquiry, Peter Apps recaps the key points

Click here to read the full story

Week two: What is the significance of the immunity application?

Sir Martin Moore-Bick has written to the attorney general requesting protection for those set to give evidence at the Grenfell Tower Inquiry. Peter Apps explains what the move means

Click here to read the full story

Week three: Architects of misfortune

This week saw the lead architects for the Grenfell Tower refurbishment give evidence to the inquiry. Peter Apps runs through the key points

Click here to read the full story

Week four: ‘I didn’t have any perception that it was the monster it’s become’

The architects continued to give evidence this week, outlining a lack of understanding of the fire risk posed by the cladding materials and its design. Nathaniel Barker reports

Click here to read the full story

Week five: ‘No adverse effect in relation to external fire spread’

As the Grenfell Tower Inquiry returns from its long absence, Peter Apps recaps the key points from a week of important evidence from the fire consultants to the refurbishment

Click here to read the full story

Week six: ‘I can’t recall any instance where I discussed the materials with building control’

Nathaniel Barker summarises what we learned from fire engineers Exova, architects Studio E and the early evidence from contractor Rydon

Click here to read the full story

Week seven: ‘I do not think I have ever worked with a contractor operating with this level of nonchalance’

Two key witnesses from contractor Rydon gave evidence this week. Peter Apps recaps some of the key points from a revealing week of evidence

Click here to read the full story

Week eight: ‘It haunts me that it wasn't challenged’

Four witnesses from contractor Rydon gave evidence this week. Lucie Heath recaps what we learned on the last week of evidence before the inquiry breaks for five weeks

Click here to read the full story

Week nine: ‘All I can say is you will be taken out for a very nice meal very soon’

This week the inquiry heard evidence from witnesses at Harley Facades, the sub-contractor responsible for Grenfell Tower’s cladding. Peter Apps recaps the key points

Click here to read the full story

Week 10: ‘As we all know, ACM will be gone rather quickly in a fire!’

As the Grenfell Tower Inquiry entered its 10th week, Jack Simpson recaps the key points from a week of important evidence from the refurbishment’s cladding contractor

Click here to read the full story

Week 11: ‘Did you get the impression Grenfell Tower was a guinea pig for this insulation?’

With witnesses from the cladding subcontractor, the firm which cut the deadly panels to shape and the clerk of works which inspected the job giving evidence this was week full of revelations. Peter Apps recaps the key points

Click here to read the full story

Week 12: ‘Would you accept that was a serious failing on your part?’

With the surveyor who inspected Grenfell Tower for compliance giving evidence, this was a crucial week from the inquiry. Dominic Brady and Peter Apps report

Click here to read the full story

Week 13: ‘Value for money is to be regarded as the key driver for this project’

With consultants to Kensington & Chelsea Tenant Management Organisation (KCTMO) giving evidence, attention at the Grenfell Tower Inquiry turned for this first time to the actions of the TMO and the council. Peter Apps reports

Click here to read the full story

Week 14: ‘Did it not occur to you at this point that your budget was simply too low?’

This week, for the first time in phase two, the inquiry heard from Kensington & Chelsea Tenant Management Organisation, the landlord that oversaw the fatal refurbishment of Grenfell Tower. Lucie Heath reports

Click here to read the full story

Week 15: ‘Have you ever informed the police that you destroyed documents relevant to their investigation?’

Witnesses from the Kensington and Chelsea Tenant Management Organisation (KCTMO) gave evidence for a second week, which began with a shocking revelation about withheld and destroyed evidence. Peter Apps recaps

Click here to read the full story

Week 16: ‘I conclude this was very serious evidence of professional negligence’

This week saw members of Kensington & Chelsea Tenant Management Organisation finish giving evidence, before the inquiry’s expert witnesses took the stand to make some highly critical assessments of the work they had seen before and during the refurbishment of Grenfell Tower. Jack Simpson recaps

Click here to read the full story

Grenfell Tower: a timeline of the refurbishment

Following the conclusion of module one of the Grenfell Inquiry’s second phase, Peter Apps presents a timeline of the key moments during the fatal refurbishment of the west London tower block

Click here to read the full story

Module two: the cladding products

Week 17: ‘It’s hard to make a note about this because we are not clean’

The start of the second module of the Grenfell Tower Inquiry phase two came with some huge revelations about the companies that sold the products used in the cladding system. Peter Apps reports

Click here to read the full story

Week 18: ‘It was just reckless optimism wasn't it?’

As the inquiry began cross-examining witnesses for the second module of its phase two work, the picture surrounding just how Grenfell Tower ended up wrapped in such dangerous materials became a little clearer. Nathaniel Barker was keeping an eye on proceedings

Click here to read the full story

Week 19: ‘And that was intentional, deliberate, dishonest?’

The Grenfell Tower Inquiry this week heard the shocking story of how the insulation manufacturer “manipulated” official testing and marketed its product “dishonestly”. Peter Apps tells the story

Click here to read the full story

Week 20: ‘We were outed by a consultant who we then had to fabricate a story to’

This week the inquiry investigated the actions of Kingspan – the manufacturer of one of the insulation products used in the tower’s cladding system. Dominic Brady reports

Click here to read the full story

Week 21: ‘It’s there in black and white isn't it? We see a complete absence of any consideration of life safety’

The story of insulation giant Kingspan’s testing and marketing of its combustible insulation for high rises was unpacked in minute detail this week. Peter Apps reports

Click here to read the full story

Week 22: ‘All we do is lie in here’

In the third week of evidence from insulation giant Kingspan, the inquiry continued to uncover shocking details about the firm’s behaviour both before and after the Grenfell Tower fire. Lucie Heath reports

Click here to read the full story

Week 23: ‘That would have come as an earthquake to you at the time, would it not?’

This week the inquiry took its deepest dive yet into the inner workings of the cladding manufacturer whose product has been blamed for the terrible spread of fire up Grenfell Tower. Nathaniel Barker reports

Click here to read the full story

Week 24: ‘Do you accept that Test 5B was Arconic's deadly secret’

The president of the firm that made and sold the cladding panels installed on Grenfell Tower was asked to account for the apparent concealment of “disastrous” fire tests on the product this week. Peter Apps reports

Click here to read the full story

Week 25: ‘This is quite an incredible list of omissions and missed instances, isn’t it?’

This week the Grenfell Tower Inquiry heard its first witnesses from the Building Research Establishment (BRE) - the testing house which carried out key fire tests on the Kingspan and Celotex insulation products which were later used on Grenfell Tower. Peter Apps reports.

Click here to read the full story

Week 26: 'You were taking an enormous risk, weren't you?'

Week 26 at the Grenfell Tower Inquiry was a key moment in understanding how dangerous products used on the tower came to be accepted by industry professionals. Dominic Brady reports

Click here to read the full story

Week 27: ‘What will happen if one building made out [of] PE core is in fire and will kill 60 to 70 persons?’

The most explosive evidence this week at the Grenfell Tower Inquiry came from those who did not attend, as the evidence which would have been presented to Arconic witnesses was displayed in their absence. Peter Apps reports

Click here to read the full story

Week 28: ‘This is a serious safety matter’

This week the Grenfell Tower Inquiry zeroed in on the British Board of Agrément, the body that produced “misleading” certificates which inspired trust in both the cladding and insulation used on the tower. Lucie Heath reports

Click here to read the full story

Week 29:  ‘Is it true that Kingspan’s position… was to do its best to ensure that science was secretly perverted for financial gain?’

The final week in this section of the Grenfell Tower Inquiry primarily examined the attempts by insulation manufacturer Kingspan to lobby government after the fire. Peter Apps reports

Click here to read the full story

How the products used in Grenfell Tower's cladding system were tested and sold

As the section of the Grenfell Tower Inquiry examining how the products used in the cladding system were tested, marketed and sold comes to a close, Peter Apps summarises what we have learned about each of the products included in the system

Click here to read the full story

Module Three: the management of the tower

Week 30: ‘There is certainly a high probability that in the event of a fire the whole building can become an inferno’

The focus of the inquiry shifted this week to the actions of the social housing providers responsible for maintaining Grenfell Tower. Pete Apps recaps what we learned

Click here to read the full story

Week 31: ‘If we cannot get out people will die’

This week saw the former residents of Grenfell Tower enter the witness box to tell of their experiences attempting to raise complaints with the council and its managing agent. Pete Apps reports

Click here to read the full story

Week 32: ‘Let's hope our luck holds and there isn't a fire’

This week saw the return of the landlord of Grenfell Tower, Kensington and Chelsea Tenant Management Organisation (KCTMO), as senior staff members attempted to explain how vital fire safety protections at the block were allowed to fall into disrepair. Lucie Heath reports

Click here to read the full story

Week 33: ‘Isn't that a serious gap in the scope of a policy meant to safeguard vulnerable people?’

A slightly disjointed week at the Grenfell Tower inquiry saw further evidence from staff at building manager Kensington and Chelsea Tenant Management Organisation (KCTMO) interspersed with the views of a cladding expert. Peter Apps reports

Click here to read the full story

Week 34: ‘Some members of the community are doing their best to spread false information’

Jack Simpson covers all the major revelations from the past week of evidence at the Grenfell Inquiry, including evidence from Laura Johnson, director of housing at the Royal Borough of Kensington and Chelsea.

Click here to read the full story  

Week 35: ‘I really didn’t like the champagne’ 

This week the Grenfell Tower Inquiry saw council witnesses, including former deputy leader Rock Feilding-Mellen and leader Nicholas Paget-Brown, questioned about their role in the story for the first time. Peter Apps reports

Click here to read the full story

Week 36: ‘Is that not a very incurious approach for a fire risk assessor?’

This week the Grenfell Tower Inquiry scrutinised the work of Carl Stokes, the man hired to carry out fire risk assessments for the block. Nathaniel Barker reports

Click here to read the full story

Week 37: ‘In giving that advice, weren’t you acting beyond your knowledge and expertise?’

A curtailed week at the Grenfell Tower Inquiry saw fire risk assessor Carl Stokes grilled over advice he gave regarding the tower’s cladding. Peter Apps reports

Click here to read the full story

Week 38: ‘Well it’s a bit more than that, isn’t it. He’s suggesting that you tell the LFB a lie’

The inquiry heard the mammoth cross-examination of KCTMO’s health and safety manager Janice Wray this week. Peter Apps reports

Click here to read the full story

Week 39: ‘What you said there was a grotesque understatement’

This week the inquiry continued to hear from former employees of Kensington and Chelsea Tenant Management Organisation, as well as two employees from the London Fire Brigade. Lucie Heath reports

Click here to read the full story

Week 40: ‘An exercise in concealment and half-truth’

Former KCTMO chief executive Robert Black gave his evidence to the inquiry this week and was asked to account for the various failures described over the previous six weeks. Peter Apps and Nathaniel Barker report.

Click here to read the full story

Week 41: ‘We should do nothing. This is not the sort of website we should be responding to’

This week saw the return of Robert Black, chief executive of Kensington and Chelsea Tenant Management Organisation (KCTMO), before the inquiry turned its attention to the defective smoke control system in the tower. Dominic Brady reports

Click here to read the full story

Week 42:‘They would leak as much as they leaked. They were what they were’

The Grenfell Tower Inquiry continued its in-depth investigation of the tower’s non-compliant smoke control system this week, with evidence from the various contractors involved in delivering it. Pete Apps reports 

Click here to read the full story

Week 43:‘Contractors at the time were not generally aware of the importance of leaving holes unsealed’

This week the inquiry focused on two of the more overlooked areas of the Grenfell Tower fire, with evidence focusing on the gas pipelines and lifts within the west London block. It was a packed week, with five witnesses giving evidence. Jack Simpson reports

Click here to read the full story

Week 44:‘I've never seen a fully compliant firefighting lift in any local authority building, to this day actually’

This week the inquiry turn the focus onto the building’s defective lifts, with evidence from an expert, contractors who worked on them and a former engineer at KCTMO. Pete Apps reports. 

Click here to read the full story

Week 45: ‘Don’t you find all this rather a surprising debate, given that the Equality Act was passed in 2010?’

The inquiry heard from expert witness Colin Todd this week, who gave his views about the work of risk assessor Carl Stokes as well as answered questions about his own guidance. Peter Apps and Nathaniel Barker report

Click here to read the full story

Week 46: ‘I think I've been very, very clear that is completely wrong’

This week the inquiry heard further expert evidence about fire risk assessor Carl Stokes’ actions, as the section of its work covering the management and maintenance of the tower concluded. Peter Apps reports

Click here to read the full story

Six key failures in the way Grenfell Tower was managed before the fire

Peter Apps recaps some of what we have learned about the actions of the Royal Borough of Kensington and Chelsea (RBKC) and Kensington and Chelsea Tenant Management Organisation (KCTMO) in the years before the fire.

Module one and two closing statements

Week 47: ‘An unedifying spectacle’

After a week of closing statements from the core participants involved in modules one and two, Lucie Heath recaps the key arguments of each group

Click here to read the full story

Module five: the fire brigade

Week 48: ‘They knew, and lives could and should have been saved’

The phase of the Grenfell Tower Inquiry examining the actions of the London Fire Brigade in the years before the fire kicked off this week with some major revelations. Peter Apps reports

Click here to read the full story

Week 49: ‘I'm not sure we've always taken every opportunity to learn as an organisation’

How the London Fire Brigade acted upon lessons from incidents in the years before the Grenfell Tower disaster came under the microscope this week at the public inquiry. Nathaniel Barker reports

Click here to read the full story

Week 50: ‘There is a culture in LFB that is very conservative. I think there is great comfort in what is familiar’

This week the inquiry heard how the London Fire Brigade (LFB) elected not to issue warnings about dangerous cladding before Grenfell and a detailed examination of its policy for checking high risk buildings. Pete Apps reports. 

Click here to read the full story

Week 51:‘We teach firefighters to expect building failure’

An unusually brief week of evidence at the Grenfell Tower Inquiry explored how a fire service neighbouring London was taking a different approach to tackling blazes in high rises. Nathaniel Barker reports

Click here to read the full story

Week 52: ‘I actually think that there is a measure of incompetence at all levels’

Expert evidence concluded the current section of the inquiry with some stinging criticism of the London Fire Brigade (LFB). Pete Apps and Grainne Cuffe report. 

Click here to read the full story

Module six: fire services

Week 53: ‘They make for chilling reading and harrowing listening’

The inquiry’s investigation into central government began this week with lawyers setting out their view on how and why firefighting policies failed. Peter Apps and Lucie Heath report

Click here to read the full story

Week 54: ‘Our consideration of evacuation at this time was something of a blind spot’

The development of policy on ‘stay put’, both nationally and for London, occupied the attention of the inquiry this week. Peter Apps reports

Click here to read the full story

Week 55: ‘My review is pretty scathing!’

In a week that included the 200th day of evidence in phase two of the inquiry, attention turned to the London Fire Brigade’s control room. Lucie Heath reports

Click here to read the full story

Week 56: ‘Why didn't we thump the table harder’

This week, the control room at the London Fire Brigade was examined further – both before and after the fire. Pete Apps and Lucie Heath report

Click here to read the full story

Week 57: ‘It was worse than slow, it was sluggish’

Former London Fire Brigade (LFB) commissioner Dany Cotton was the star witness this week, as the inquiry continued to delve into the brigade’s knowledge and training before the Grenfell Tower fire. Jack Simpson, Grainne Cuffe and Pete Apps report

Click here to read the full story

Week 58: ‘I don't think we deserve to ask for trust until we demonstrate different outcomes’

A current and former commissioner of the London Fire Brigade (LFB) wrapped up the inquiry’s investigation into the actions of the brigade before the fire. Grainne Cuffe and Peter Apps report.

Module six: testing and government 

One of the major scandals of our time: key revelations as the Grenfell Tower Inquiry turns to government

The government was accused of “covering up” the risks of dangerous cladding as its “unbridled passion for deregulation” left it a “junior party” to the construction industry as the latest phase of the public inquiry opened today. Peter Apps summarises some of the main points

Click here to read the full story

Week 59: ‘Recent tests have apparently shown it continued to burn for 20 minutes after the flame was taken away’

After shocking opening statements, the Grenfell Tower Inquiry turned its attention to the work of Local Authority Building Control. Pete Apps reports

Click here to read the full story

Week 60: ‘You could have an exact repeat of the Dubai fire in any number of buildings in London’

The Grenfell Tower Inquiry turned its attention to the work of the National House Building Council this week, with shocking revelations about the extent of the warnings issued to central government before the fire. Peter Apps reports

Click here to read the full story

Week 61: ‘Mistakes are meant for learning, not repeating’

In the first hearings of the new year, the Grenfell Tower Inquiry heard closing statements from the firefighting section of phase two. Lucie Heath reports

Click here to read the full story

Week 62: Did it ever occur to you that this act of collaboration was, in one sense, corrupting?

The Grenfell Tower Inquiry returned to the work of the National House Building Council (NHBC) this week, with a new shocking revelation about the government’s actions in the immediate aftermath of the fire. Peter Apps reports

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Week 63: ‘It came after the general move to deregulation. So more regulation was not welcome’

The government’s focus on deregulation before the Grenfell Tower fire was placed in the spotlight this week with a series of shocking revelations about its failure to amend fire safety guidance. Pete Apps and Grainne Cuffe report

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Week 64: ‘I didn’t think ACM would be suitable for use in any high-rise buildings. I don’t think anyone did’

This week, the Building Research Establishment’s Dr Sarah Colwell gave more than three days of evidence, with some huge revelations about what was known about the dangers of aluminium composite material years before the fire and the mass confusion over the government’s building regulations. Peter Apps and Jack Simpson report

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Week 65: ‘Unless the government does something now about ACM panels, people will die’

Further evidence from the Building Research Establishment and the first government witnesses added new depth to our understanding of how warnings were missed before the Grenfell Tower fire. Peter Apps reports 

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Week 66: ‘Was there a cover-up?’

The latest evidence from the Grenfell Tower Inquiry tracked the government’s failure to act on fire safety warnings right up until the months before the fire. Peter Apps and Grainne Cuffe report

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Week 67: ‘When exposed to a fire, the aluminium melts away and exposes the polyethylene. Whoosh!’

This week the inquiry heard disturbing new evidence about the failure of senior government officials to act on warnings about dangerous cladding in the years before the Grenfell Tower fire. Peter Apps reports

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Week 68: ‘Can we agree that was a pretty dangerous thing to have, all this falling on one man’s shoulders?’

Three senior civil servants gave evidence this week, including the official who had responsibility for building regulations guidance on fire safety in the years before Grenfell. Peter Apps, Lucie Heath, Stephen Delahunty and Grainne Cuffe report

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Week 69: ‘It was just unthinkable. You had the makings here of a crisis you could not comprehend’

This week, civil servant Brian Martin gave his long-awaited evidence to the Grenfell Tower Inquiry. Peter Apps reports

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Week 70: ‘Show me the bodies’

An important week at the Grenfell Tower Inquiry saw a dramatic conclusion to the mammoth cross-examination of civil servant Brian Martin, as well as the first politicians. Peter Apps and Lucie Heath report

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Week 71: ‘I have changed my schedule to fit this in. I do have an extremely busy day meeting people’

Three politicians who were responsible for building regulations before Grenfell appeared before the inquiry this week, including the former communities secretary Eric Pickles, who responded to the coroner’s letter following the Lakanal House fire. Peter Apps and Lucie Heath report

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Module Four: aftermath

Week 72: 'The system isn't broken. It was built this way'

This week the inquiry turned to the shocking story of the lack of support for bereaved and survivors in the immediate aftermath of the Grenfell Tower fire. Peter Apps, Lucie Heath, Grainne Cuffe and Jack Simpson report

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Week 73: ‘Most people would regard that as hopeless’

This week, the Grenfell Tower Inquiry heard about the Royal Borough of Kensington and Chelsea’s chaotic response in the immediate aftermath of the blaze, from the staff responsible for it. Pete AppsStephen Delahunty and Grainne Cuffe report

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Week 74: ‘Do you agree that RBKC was ill-prepared and incapable to meet its duties’

This week, Nicholas Holgate, former chief executive of the Royal Borough of Kensington and Chelsea, was grilled on his failure to hand over control of the aftermath of the fire, despite the borough’s lack of capacity. Peter Apps reports

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Week 75: ‘It still shocks me to the core that that’s how we treat our citizens in this country’

This week the inquiry heard witnesses from the housing management body discuss their role in the aftermath of the Grenfell Tower fire, followed by a range of witnesses from other organisations which supported the response. Peter Apps and Grainne Cuffe report

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Week 76: ‘I fear this will become our New Orleans’

This week the inquiry heard from central government figures and members of the London-wide emergency response arrangements. Peter Apps and Grainne Cuffe report

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Week 77: ‘The planning wasn’t done and there was nothing for us to be drawing on’

The Grenfell Tower Inquiry’s examination of the aftermath of the fire concluded with witnesses from central government. Peter Apps reports

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Module seven: expert evidence and closing statements

Week 78: ‘The abandonment of the ‘stay put’ strategy for high-rise residential buildings is essential’

This week the Grenfell Tower Inquiry heard a range of expert witnesses discuss their reports. Peter Apps and Grainne Cuffe report

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Week 79: ‘You could argue the system was created to enable people to circumvent the rules’

The Grenfell Tower Inquiry continued to hear expert evidence this week, with two senior figures in the world of fire safety academia criticising the government’s approach before and after the blaze. Peter Apps and Grainne Cuffe report 

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Week 80: ‘The evidence points to wilful blindness and complacency towards safety’

As the inquiry moves into its final stages, lawyers for the key players gave statements about the evidence surrounding central government. Peter Apps reports

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Week 81: ‘This is Islamophobia. It’s racism. It is the elephant staring back at us in the room’

This week, closing statements covering the aftermath of the fire delivered a shocking new revelation and an expert toxicologist gave his views on the causes of the deaths. Peter Apps reports

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Module eight: further evidence relating to the deceased

Week 82: ‘Their chance to hear about the circumstances in which their loved ones died is the culmination of five years of waiting’

The Grenfell Tower Inquiry moved into its final module this week, with evidence relating to the circumstances in which the victims died. Peter Apps reports

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Week 83: ‘They died together as they lived: caring for one another’

A second week of evidence relating to the circumstances in which the victims of the fire died delivered more heartbreaking stories about their final moments. Peter Apps recaps

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Week 84: ‘Every decision affects someone who is an adored child, a beloved sister, a respected uncle, a needed mother’

The final week of oral evidence for the Grenfell Tower Inquiry’s second phase contained more heartbreaking evidence about the deaths in the tower. Peter Apps reports

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Closing statements

Week 85: ‘The merry-go-round turns still, the notes of its melody clearly audible in the last few days’

The Grenfell Tower Inquiry returned this week for closing statements from lawyers representing the bereaved and survivors and the various parties under scrutiny for the fire. Pete Apps reports.  

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