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Grenfell Inquiry day 23: TV images ‘could have assisted’ firefighting and rescue effort

The inquiry hears contradicting information about the control centre’s television, which was not used to inform commanders of the devastating spread of the blaze. 

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Grenfell Inquiry day 23: control centre TV images ‘could have assisted’ fire fighting and rescue effort #ukhousing

Key points

  • Senior London Fire Brigade officer says television in control centre “wasn’t working” – contradicting colleague’s claim last week that the decision was taken not to turn it on as images could have been distressing
  • News pictures could have informed call handlers about the devastating spread of the fire as they gave advice to trapped residents, officer says. “A picture paints a thousand words,” he tells inquiry
  • Decision was not taken to evacuate until 2.30am, with news images on smartphones influencing advice given to residents
  • Information about specific rescue attempts was not sought by officers leading operation from firefighters on the ground

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Television images – and lack of them – were at the heart of the latest Grenfell Tower Inquiry hearing today.

Jason Oliff, who was a station manager on development at the London Fire Brigade at the time of last summer’s tragic blaze, gave evidence to the Martin Moore-Bick chaired probe.

Mr Oliff, who was undertaking an on-the-job training period after being promoted in 2016, was nearing the end of his first ever shift as ‘officer of the day’ when the fire was reported in the early hours of 14 June 2017.

After receiving a message to his pager shortly before 1:30am, he attended the back-up control room in Stratford, east London, which was acting as the nerve centre of the frantic firefighting operation.

Mr Oliff’s colleague, Joanne Smith, last week told the inquiry that while the usual control room in Merton had a television that showed 24-hour news, a decision was taken not to turn on a TV set in Stratford as the news channel pictures could be distressing for staff communicating with people inside the burning building.

But Mr Oliff’s evidence today left the issue shrouded in mystery after he declared that he had been told the TV set was broken.

“As you walk into the Stratford control room the head desk is in front of you and the screen is behind it, and it was switched off,” he said. “I noticed the TV was off and when I said this to, I think, the officer of the watch, I was told it was broken, it wasn’t working.”

News footage could have helped control room staff make better decisions on the night, said Oliff.

“When you are monitoring calls and listening for information from the main scheme radio, you are trying to formulate a picture of what actions crews are taking and how the incident is developing. Having a screen up in the control room would give everyone in that room an overview of what the emergency services were dealing with.”

He added: “I would not have had authority to change decisions in the control room at that time but [TV screens] may have given the officer of the watch or [other key staff] an overview of the development of the incident and they may have been able to make an assessment to change the ‘stay put’ policy.

“A picture paints a thousand words.”

According to evidence from both Ms Smith and Mr Oliff, the decision to tell operators to start advising 999 callers to attempt escape from the burning building rather than awaiting rescue was taken at about 2.30am.

Mr Oliff also recounted how a news clip he’d seen on a colleague’s mobile phone of the extent of the blaze informed his thinking when he was called over to help a call operator with a very difficult situation during the night.

Mr Oliff advised the operator to tell the male caller to try to leave the building with his children without going back for his wife, who had become separated from them.

In a written statement, Mr Oliff described it as a “highly stressful situation”. But he said the news footage he’d seen “allowed me to see what we were up against and the conditions crews were dealing with”.

Meanwhile, Mr Oliff conceded that using a mobile phone to speak to the command unit set up to control operations on the ground was a departure from usual policy.

“This was not normal procedure. Normal procedure is that information is passed to the command vehicles by air waves radio. This is sufficient for a low number of fire safety guidance calls. The unprecedented nature of the incident we were dealing with meant… it was adapted.”

He added that he did not take his radio into the control room.

“I did not have access to an airwave radio… I had my own personal airwave radio which I left in my vehicle when I arrived because part of my role as officer of the day is not usually to communicate with the fire ground or incident commander directly.

“I was briefed to take over responsibility for fire safety guidance information and… it was my decision to use my mobile phone to contact the command unit.”

Mr Oliff was pressed on whether he sought information from the fire crews on the ground about specific rescue attempts. “No, I didn’t,” he said.

“This was an unprecedented incident. The amounts of information we were passing over – I would imagine the fire crews were extremely stretched and I imagined that any information they had about rescues they would pass back when they had the time.”

The Grenfell Tower Inquiry

The Grenfell Tower Inquiry

Closing statements

 

Day 85: victims' lawyers attack the fire brigade

 

Further expert evidence

Including some additional evidence from emergency call handlers, bereaved and relatives

 

Day 84: further evidence from survivors and relatives

Day 83: swift evacuation of tower possible if residents alerted

Day 82: initial fire was extinguished but then returned to the flat

Day 81: overheating fridge-freezer most likely cause of fire

Day 80: fire doors installed did not match product tested

Day 79: resident advised to stay put despite fire in flat

Day 78: insulation and cladding material below required standard

Day 77: molten plastic spread blaze down tower

Day 76: 'stay put' should be dropped when fire spreads across floors

 

Other witness evidence

Police, ambulance, gas suppliers, council, TMO and call room operators give evidence

 

Day 75: call room operators give evidence

Day 74: further evidence from TMO officers

Day 73: TMO boss failed to pass information to firefighters

Day 72: fire finally extinguished when gas switched off

Day 71: further questions over stay put advice

Day 70: the police evidence

 

The bereaved, survivors and relatives’ evidence

 

Day 69: video shows smoke billowing through fire door

Day 68: KCTMO removed self closing mechanism and never replaced it

Day 67: gaps in cladding fixed with duct tape

Day 66: 'don't fix broken system with a sticking plaster'

Day 65: survivor dragged disabled man down nine floors to safety

Day 64: KCTMO 'did not replace broken fire door'

Day 63: foam insulation inside cladding 'exposed' says survivor

Day 62: father gives harrowing account of son's death

Day 61: council’s management organisation slammed for faulty electrics

Day 60: stay put advice ‘led to deaths’, residents say

Day 59: residents describe problems with new windows

Day 58: survivor describes how daughter saved his life

Day 57: firefighter evidence ‘a slap in the face’, says survivor

Day 56: relations with contractor were ‘toxic’

Day 55: resident 'never happy' with stay-put advice

Day 54: tenant gives evidence about housing association

Day 53: stay put advice 'felt like trap'

Day 52: resident saved by son's phone call

 

The firefighters’ evidence

 

Day 51: firefighter feared encouraging residents to jump

Day 50: the LFB commissioner

Day 49: fire chief reveals frustration over lack of building plans

Day 48: internal fire spread 'bigger story' than cladding

Day 47: fire officer considered evacuating crews over building collapse fears

Day 46: 'we were improvising' senior firefighter admits

Day 45: firefighter urged for abandonment of 'stay put' policy

Day 44: firefighter recalls radio signal difficulties

Day 43: call hander 'uncomfortable' with insisting residents stay put

Day 42: residents only told to leave if they called fire brigade back

Day 41: breathing equipment delay 'hampered rescues on upper floors'

Day 40: chiefs told firefighters to abandon policy

Day 39: firefighters reveal dramatic rescue of children

Day 38: firefighters issue aplogies to families

Day 37: council 'unable to provide tower plans'

Day 36: QC defends inquiry process

Day 35: Javid would welcome interim recommendations

Day 34: water from hose 'too weak' to reach the flames

Day 33: 'oh my god, we've been telling people to stay put'

Day 32: further fire fighter describes lack of equipment and low water pressure

Day 31: 'incredibly difficult' task of recording information outlined

Day 30: struggle to maintain control over rescue operation described

Day 29: fire service 'overwhelmed' by survival guidance calls

Day 28: 'the building beat us'

Day 27: firefighters 'forced to abandon plans to reach roof'

Day 26: poor signage hindered rescue efforts

Day 25: water pressure left firefighting equipment 'like garden hose'

Day 24: decision to abandon 'stay put' explored

Day 23: TV images 'could have assissted' rescue effort

Day 22: description of hectic scenes in the control centre

Day 21: account from the fire service 'nerve centre'

Day 20: firefighter describes 'huge volume' of calls from trapped residents

Day 19: firefighter 'given no training on cladding fires'

Day 18: evacuation would have been 'huge catastrophe'

Day 17: firefighters describe access and lift issues

Day 16: scenes of carnage likened to 9/11

Day 15: firefighters recount trauma of survival guidance calls

Day 14: firefighters describe spread of blaze

Day 13: firefighters recall radio difficulties

Day 12: "it was like a war zone"

Day 11: questions raised over fire fighters' radios

Day 10: watch manager emotional under questioning

Day nine: lead firefighter 'not trained in stay put policy'

 

The expert reports: authors give evidence to inquiry

 

Day eight: where the fire started

Day seven: what was in the cladding?

Day six: the cause and spread of the fire

Day five: expert highlights key issues

Day four: firefighters defend response to fire

Day three: council and contractors appear for the first time

Day two: lawyers for the survivors make their case

Day one: expert evidence released on cladding and stay put

 

The commemoration hearings

 

30 May: Grenfell Council 'recognised it should not house disabled victim above four storeys'

29 May: Anger on day six of the Grenfell Inquiry

25 May: Grenfell families 'forced to live in chimney with stay put policy'

24 May: Grenfell family complained about father being housed on 17th floor

23 May: Tributes to children on third day of Grenfell hearings

22 May: Emotions run high as Grenfell bereaved shown footage of the tower burning

21 May: Grenfell victims share tributes as inquiry opens

 

Never Again campaign

Never Again campaign

In the days following the Grenfell Tower fire on 14 June 2017, Inside Housing launched the Never Again campaign to call for immediate action to implement the learning from the Lakanal House fire, and a commitment to act – without delay – on learning from the Grenfell Tower tragedy as it becomes available.

One year on, we have extended the campaign asks in the light of information that has emerged since.

Here are our updated asks:

GOVERNMENT

  • Act on the recommendations from Dame Judith Hackitt’s review of building regulations to tower blocks of 18m and higher. Commit to producing a timetable for implementation by autumn 2018, setting out how recommendations that don’t require legislative change can be taken forward without delay
  • Follow through on commitments to fully ban combustible materials on high-rise buildings
  • Unequivocally ban desktop studies
  • Review recommendations and advice given to ministers after the Lakanal House fire and implement necessary changes
  • Publish details of all tower blocks with dangerous cladding, insulation and/or external panels and commit to a timeline for remedial works. Provide necessary guidance to landlords to ensure that removal work can begin on all affected private and social residential blocks by the end of 2018. Complete quarterly follow-up checks to ensure that remedial work is completed to the required standard. Checks should not cease until all work is completed.
  • Stand by the prime minister’s commitment to fully fund the removal of dangerous cladding
  • Fund the retrofitting of sprinkler systems in all tower blocks across the UK (except where there are specific structural reasons not to do so)
  • Explore options for requiring remedial works on affected private sector residential tower blocks

LOCAL GOVERNMENT

  • Take immediate action to identify privately owned residential tower blocks so that cladding and external panels can be checked

LANDLORDS

  • Publish details of the combinations of insulations and cladding materials for all high rise blocks
  • Commit to ensuring that removal work begins on all blocks with dangerous materials by the end of 2018 upon receipt of guidance from government
  • Publish current fire risk assessments for all high rise blocks (the Information Commissioner has required councils to publish and recommended that housing associations should do the same). Work with peers to share learning from assessments and improve and clarify the risk assessment model.
  • Commit to renewing assessments annually and after major repair or cladding work is carried out. Ensure assessments consider the external features of blocks. Always use an appropriate, qualified expert to conduct assessments.
  • Review and update evacuation policies and ‘stay put’ advice in the light of risk assessments, and communicate clearly to residents
  • Adopt Dame Judith Hackitt’s recommended approach for listening to and addressing tenants’ concerns, with immediate effect

CURRENT SIGNATORIES:

  • Chartered Institute of Housing
  • G15
  • National Federation of ALMOs
  • National Housing Federation
  • Placeshapers

 

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